

Carolina and Georgia provided more room for common opportunity than did the confined West Indies. After the great planters helped themselves to large tracts in the lowlands for rice and indigo plantations, there was still plenty of land left in the Piedmont to endow most common whites with substantial farms. And because of the open frontier with Spanish enemies and potential Indian foes, the Carolina and Georgia great planters especially needed a militia drawn from the ranks of common whites. Consequently, the common and great planters of Carolina and Georgia enjoyed a more stable relationship than had their predecessors on small and crowded Barbados.

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Middle Colonies



1600-1700



A Dutch colonial couple in the foreground, with the shipping and buildings of New Amsterdam in the background, c. 1650. The image conveys the centrality of transatlantic commerce and the prominence of enslaved Africans in the Dutch colonial town. From I. N. Phelps Stokes, Iconography of Manhattan Island (New York, 1915).

DURING THE EARLY SEVENTEENTH CENTURY, the English developed two distinct and populous clusters of settlements along the Atlantic seaboard: the Chesapeake to the south and New England to the north. Until mid-century, the English neglected the intervening mid-Atlantic coast, despite its advantages. More fertile and temperate than New England, but far healthier than the Chesapeake, the mid-Atlantic region was especially promising for cultivating grain, raising livestock, and reproducing people. The region also boasted three navigable rivers, reaching deep into the interior: the Susquehanna, Delaware, and Hudson. The English neglect enabled the Dutch and Swedes to establish their own small colonies: New Netherland in the Hudson Valley and New Sweden in the Delaware Valley. Although the English protested, they initially lacked the power to oust their rivals, and deemed it impolitic to try, for the Dutch and Swedes were fellow Protestants and allies in the European wars of religion during the early seventeenth century.

At mid-century, however, as the English grew in power and ambition, their rulers developed a violent envy of Dutch wealth. King Charles II (1660-85) and his brother, James, the Duke of York, hoped to build the crown's clout within England by expanding the empire in America. They recognized the connection, pioneered by the Dutch, between overseas colonies, commercial expansion, and national power. By conquering New Netherland, Charles and James meant to strengthen England's commerce by weakening its principal rival, the Dutch empire. The acquisition of New Netherland (which had swallowed up New Sweden) would also close the gap between the Chesapeake and New England, promoting their mutual defense against other empires and the Indians. Finally, a conquest also promised increased crown control over its own fractious colonies.

Compared with the Spanish, French, and Dutch rulers, the English monarch exercised little power over his colonists, primarily because of the persistent reliance on a proprietary system of colonization. During the early seventeenth century, the underfunded English crown had lacked the means to launch and administer distant colonies. Instead the crown entrusted early colonization to private interests licensed by royal charters, which awarded the proprietors both title to colonial land and the right to govern the colonists—subject to royal oversight, which was sporadic at best. Most charters went to joint stock companies of merchants—for example, the Virginia Company—or to especially wealthy and ambitious aristocrats, such as Lord Baltimore, who obtained Maryland, or the Earl of Carlisle, who procured the Lesser Antilles.

The colonists compelled their distant and weak proprietors to share political power. The proprietors appointed the governor and council, but propertied colonists elected an assembly with power over finances. Throughout the empire, propertied Englishmen cherished legislative control over taxation as their most fundamental liberty. The proprietors accepted assemblies as a means to attract or retain propertied colonists, who were essential to

a colony's economic development, which was critical to the proprietors' revenues.

The New England colonies were a special case. Leading Puritans formed the Massachusetts Bay Company to secure a colonial charter, which they carried across the Atlantic to establish a virtually independent colonial government. Without the benefit of any charter, Puritans or their dissidents founded the adjoining colonies of Plymouth, Connecticut, and Rhode Island. In 1663, Rhode Island and Connecticut belatedly obtained royal charters; Plymouth never so succeeded. By virtue of their especially indulgent charters, the New England colonies were virtually independent of crown authority. Answering to no external proprietors, the New English developed republican regimes where the propertied men elected their governors and councils, as well as their assemblies, and where much decision-making was dispersed to the many small towns.

The proprietary system became a liability later in the seventeenth century, as the crown developed greater imperial ambitions. Noting the growing numbers and prosperity of the colonists, imperial officials sought tighter control, the better to regulate and tax colonial commerce. The officials also worried that colonial wealth would attract predation by another empire. Divided into many distinct colonies, each jealous of the other and all internally divided by factions in their assemblies, the colonial arrangement seemed designed for many separate surrenders rather than for collective defense. In a crisis with another empire, one English colony could appeal for help from the others, but it was unlikely to receive much. Imperial bureaucrats believed that the proprietary colonies should first be converted into royal colonies and then consolidated into an overarching government like the Spanish viceroyalty of New Spain.

During the seventeenth century, crown officials gradually converted a few proprietary colonies into royal colonies. Such conversion primarily meant that the king, rather than a proprietor, appointed the governor and council, for the crown felt obliged to retain the elected assemblies. The crown acted first where the revenues were greatest, to secure control over tobacco-rich Virginia and the sugar colonies of Barbados, the Leeward Islands, and Jamaica. The crown was slower to reorganize the New England colonies because they lacked a lucrative staple critical to the royal revenue. Moreover, the numerous Puritan colonists promised to make any imperial attempt to compel their obedience expensive and difficult.

In 1664 an English naval squadron with soldiers crossed the Atlantic, bound for North America. Rumor insisted, the New English feared, and the Dutch hoped that the flotilla was bound to Boston to subdue the Puritans. Instead, the warships sailed to the Hudson to conquer New Netherland. But the crown also meant that conquest to impress a New English audience, to intimidate the colonists into a new respect for royal authority. By smiting the Dutch, the crown hoped to strengthen its own power within a more

onsolidated empire. The conquest also initiated the development of a new cluster of English colonies—the middle colonies, defined by their setting between New England and the Chesapeake.


THE DUTCH EMPIRE

The Dutch colony on the Hudson River was a relatively minor enterprise in an especially wealthy, ambitious, and far-flung empire that developed with remarkable rapidity. During the early seventeenth century, the Netherlands emerged as an economic and military giant, out of all proportion to its confined geography and small population of 1.5 million (compared with 5 million English and 20 million French). The Dutch exploited their prime commercial location by the mouth of the Rhine River, beside the North Sea, and near the entrance to the Baltic Sea. The Netherlands became the nexus of northern European commerce between France and England to the west, the German cities and principalities to the east, and Russia and the Scandinavian countries to the northeast. Possessing Europe's most efficient merchant marine and fishing fleet, the Dutch dominated the carrying trade of northern and western Europe, the North Seas fisheries, and Arctic whaling. In 1670 the Dutch employed 120,000 sailors on vessels totaling 568,000 tons—more than the combined shipping of Spain, France, and England. The English writer Daniel Defoe aptly explained:

The Dutch must be understood as they really are, the Middle Persons in Trade, the Factors and Brokers of Europe. . . . They *buy to sell* again, *take in to send out*, and the greatest Part of their vast Commerce consists in being supply'd from All Parts of the World, that they may supply All the World again.

The great Dutch city of Amsterdam (and its port of Rotterdam) became the preeminent shipping, banking, insurance, printing, and textile manufacturing center, not only in the Netherlands but in all of northern Europe.

The Dutch economy also benefited from a liberal government that adopted policies of intellectual freedom and religious toleration unique in seventeenth-century Europe. While the other European states were developing authoritarian and centralized monarchies, the Dutch opted for a decentralizing republic dominated by wealthy merchants and rural aristocrats. Each of the seven provinces in the Dutch confederation enjoyed domestic autonomy, but the most populous and prosperous province, Holland, usually determined the nation's military and foreign policies. Over the course of the seventeenth century, the confederation's military commander, usually a prince of the House of Orange, accumulated growing power over foreign affairs.



Seeking uniformity, most European realms persecuted religious dissidents, often expelling minorities. The Dutch welcomed those outcasts, including French Protestants and Iberian and German Jews, reaping their talents and investments. European intellectuals also gravitated to Amsterdam because the Dutch allowed greater latitude to new ideas. The great seventeenth-century philosophers René Descartes, John Locke, and Benedict de Spinoza all emigrated to escape intolerance in their own countries. A German visitor observed that the Dutch "love nothing so much as they do their freedom."

The combination of republican government, religious toleration, naval power, colonial trade, and a manufacturing boom endowed the Dutch with the greatest national wealth and the highest standard of living in Europe. Perceived as a land of opportunity, the Netherlands attracted a steady stream of ambitious immigrants, particularly from Germany and Scandinavia. Many came to serve in the "Dutch" army and navy, constituting a majority of the soldiers and sailors who extended the power of that small country.

The wealth and power of the Netherlands were especially remarkable because they had been achieved so rapidly from modest origins. Until the late sixteenth century, the Netherlands was subordinated within the Spanish empire in Europe. Largely Protestant, and specifically Calvinist, the Dutch bitterly resented Spanish economic exploitation and religious persecution. During the 1570s, the Dutch provinces rebelled and gradually secured their independence after a long, hard war.

Both to weaken their enemy and to reap profits, Dutch warships carried the conflict around the globe to prey on Spanish and Portuguese shipping and colonies and to build their own lucrative and far-flung empire. By capturing fortified entrepôts in the East Indies (Indonesia) and Ceylon (Sri Lanka), the Dutch supplanted the Portuguese as the primary carriers of the especially valuable spice and silk trade from Asia to Europe. To protect that trade route, in 1652 the Dutch founded a small colony at the Cape of Good Hope at the southern tip of Africa—the future Capetown, South Africa.

During the early and middle seventeenth century, the Dutch also stole the Portuguese primacy in the other two great, and interrelated, forms of imperial commerce conducted by Europeans: the export of sugar from American plantations and the transportation of slaves from West Africa to cultivate that sugar. In 1637 the Dutch captured Elmina Castle, the principal Portuguese fortified trading post on the west coast of Africa.

After 1640 most of the slaves sent to the Americas went in Dutch rather than Portuguese vessels, enriching the merchants of Amsterdam rather than those of Lisbon. During the 1630s, the Dutch seized the northeastern coast of Portuguese Brazil, then the preeminent sugar-producing colony in the Americas. By 1650 the Dutch were refining most of the sugar consumed in Europe. The Dutch also occupied several islands in the West Indies, including Curaçao, St. Martin, and St. Eustatius, to augment their sugar planta-

tions and to facilitate smuggling with, and piracy upon, Spanish ports and ships in the Caribbean.

To prosecute their attacks and build their new empire, the Dutch developed the most formidable fleet of warships in Europe. A mix of public and private investment, this navy sought both national power and mercantile profit. In the single most spectacular success, a Dutch flotilla intercepted and captured the entire Spanish treasure fleet homeward bound from the Caribbean in 1628. The loss of the ships and 200,000 pounds of silver virtually bankrupted the Spanish crown and enormously enriched the Dutch investors in the attacking fleet.

The Dutch victories dismayed the Portuguese, who lost confidence in the protection of their Spanish king. Fed up with Spanish rule, the Portuguese rebelled, reasserting their independence in 1640, further weakening the once mighty Spanish empire. That decline elevated the Netherlands to preeminence in the European competition for American commerce and colonial power. By 1650 the Dutch reaped most of the profits taken in European commerce with China, India, Africa, Brazil, and the Caribbean. In turn, that commerce stimulated the further development of manufactures in Holland to supply outgoing cargoes and to build more ships for commerce and war.

However, the Dutch spread themselves perilously thin in their effort, as a small country, to maintain global trade by imperial violence. Their European rivals watched with envy and noted that commerce, colonies, naval might, and national wealth fed upon one another. By mid-century, the Dutch faced attacks from their former allies against Spain: the French and the English. Their targets included the seventeenth-century Dutch colony along the Hudson, New Netherland, which was a minor operation on the fringes of an overextended empire with wealthier assets and higher priorities to defend elsewhere in the world.

NEW NETHERLAND

Beginning with Henry Hudson in 1609, Dutch merchants annually sent ships across the Atlantic and up the Hudson River to trade for furs with the Indians. Seventeenth-century ships could ascend the river 160 miles, as far as the future Albany, a greater distance than was possible on any other river on the Atlantic seaboard. From the upper Hudson, traders could contact distant northern Indians coming in canoes via two corridors. The first proceeded northward by Lake George, Lake Champlain, and the Richelieu River to the St. Lawrence, and the second reached westward via the Mohawk River to the Great Lakes. But using either corridor required the goodwill of the Iroquois.

In 1614 Dutch traders established a year-round presence on the upper Hudson by founding Fort Nassau, later relocated and renamed Fort Orange,

with an associated village called Beverwyck ("Beaver Town"). During the late 1620s, Fort Orange had only about fifty Dutch inhabitants, about half fur traders and half soldiers, all employees of the monopolistic Dutch West India Company. Fur trading operations wanted only a few colonists, to minimize the costs of supply and to discourage competitors trading on their own accounts.

The Dutch West India Company, however, recognized that it needed populous settlements to protect the mouth of the Hudson. Without strength in numbers to guard the colony's entrance, the furs at Fort Orange would tempt easy seizure by French or English warships. In the lower Hudson Valley, farms also could help the company by producing grain, cattle, and lumber to supply the fur traders at Fort Orange and to ship to the Dutch West Indies to feed the slaves on the sugar plantations. In 1625, the Dutch founded the fortified town of New Amsterdam on Manhattan Island at the mouth of the river. Possessing the finest harbor on the Atlantic seaboard, New Amsterdam served as the colony's largest town, major seaport, and government headquarters. New Amsterdam encouraged agricultural settlement in its vicinity to the east on Long Island, to the north beside the Hudson, and to the west in present-day New Jersey. New Netherlands became bifurcated between a small fur-trading post upriver and larger agricultural settlements on the lower river.

The bifurcation led to different Indian policies in the two halves of the valley. Upriver the Dutch were too few, and too dependent upon trade, to intimidate their native neighbors, the formidable Iroquois Five Nations (primarily the nearby Mohawk). Terrifying as enemies but invaluable as trading partners, the Iroquois determined the success or failure of the trading post: Fort Orange became as much a Mohawk as a Dutch asset.

The upriver respect for Iroquois power contrasted with the Dutch treatment of the Hudson River Indians, a disunited set of Algonquian-speaking bands. Compared with the Iroquois, the Algonquians of the lower Hudson contributed little to the fur trade and their warriors were fewer and less well supplied with firearms. Because the downriver Dutch came in substantial numbers to develop farms, they also regarded the Algonquians as a nuisance best removed as quickly as possible. On the lower Hudson, the Dutch could indulge in the ethnocentrism that they had to restrain on the upper river.

Come to trade or to farm, the Dutch made virtually no missionary effort, in contrast to the French, the Spanish, and even the Puritan English. In New Netherland, the ministers of the Dutch Reformed Church were few, preoccupied with the colonists, and disgusted by the Indians. The colony's preeminent clergyman declared, "As to the natives of this country, I find them entirely savage and wild, strangers to all decency, yea, uncivil and stupid as garden poles, [and] proficient to all wickedness and godlessness." For want of trying, the New Netherland clergy made only a single Indian convert, and he soon lapsed, pawning his Bible for brandy. Fundamentally commercial in

outlook, the Dutch regarded missions as an unnecessary expense, if not an impediment to free trade with natives, who preferred their traditional beliefs and disliked meddling missionaries. The Dutch counted on the high quality and low prices of their goods to attract Indian trade, while the French hoped that missions would bind natives into their orbit, compensating for their economic disadvantages.

Despite the growing fur trade, the Dutch West India Company faltered toward bankruptcy. From 4,700 furs in 1624 the colony's exports surged to 16,300 in 1635 and 35,000 in 1656, but the company increasingly lost its share in the growing trade to illegal competition from private traders, who defied the official monopoly. Accepting defeat, in 1639 the company opened the fur trade on the upper Hudson to any colonist. The corporate leaders hoped to earn more by collecting a 10 percent tax on fur exports than they could by pretending to exercise a monopoly. But the company continued to lose money, for its New Netherland revenues lagged behind its expenditures as the colonists mastered tax evasion.

Although ruinous to the West India Company, the competitive fur trade benefited the Five Nation Iroquois, who took advantage of the market when it was favorable and employed intimidation when it was not. At Beverwyck in 1643 a visiting French priest noted, "Trade is free to every one, which enables the savages to obtain all things very cheaply: each of the Dutch outbidding his companion, and being satisfied, provided he can gain some little profit." During the early 1650s, when a maritime war with the English interrupted the flow of Dutch trade goods, the shortages and high prices angered the Mohawk, who promptly slaughtered the roaming cattle of the Beverwyck colonists. The local officials then wisely obliged their traders to give up their last remaining goods to bestow on the Mohawk as presents, restoring amity. Fortunately, a peace with England soon revived the trade. No sentimentalists, the Iroquois recognized that only economic interest bound them to the Dutch. In 1659 a Mohawk chief noted, "The Dutch say we are brothers and that we are joined together with chains, but that lasts only as long as we have beavers. After that we are no longer thought of."

Dutch relations with the Indians were far worse in the lower Hudson Valley, where the growing numbers of colonists clashed with the local Algonquians. Colonists' roving pigs and cattle invaded cornfields, provoking the natives to kill and eat the livestock—which, of course, outraged the settlers. In 1639 an especially heavy-handed governor, Willem Kieft, worsened relations by demanding that the Algonquians pay an annual tribute in maize or wampum. They bitterly protested that Kieft "must be a very mean fellow to come to live in this country without being invited by them, and now wish to compel them to give him their corn for nothing." Some Algonquians resisted payment and killed two colonists. Declaring the river Indians subject to Dutch law, the governor demanded the surrender of suspects for trial and execution, but the natives refused, clinging to their autonomy.

In 1643, Kieft made a bloody example of one Algonquian band that, oblivious of danger, had encamped on Manhattan Island. Kieft sent soldiers at night to surprise and butcher at least eighty Indians, mostly women and children. Outraged, the other river Indian bands attacked the scattered farms of colonial settlers, burning, looting, and killing in the rural settlements around New Amsterdam. The colonial dead included Anne Hutchinson, the famous Puritan dissident, who had moved to New Netherland after her exile to Rhode Island.

The Dutch entrusted command of their counterattacks to another notorious New Englander, Captain John Underhill, a mercenary who had helped massacre the Pequot Indians in 1637. Applying similar tactics to the Algonquians of New Netherland, Underhill's men killed more than five hundred fleeing from a burning village in 1644. A year later, the defeated Algonquians sued for peace. In three subsequent wars, in 1655, 1659-60, and 1663-64, the Dutch further devastated the Algonquians, who lost most of their lands. Although the Dutch had won, they paid a heavy price, saddling New Netherland with a dangerous reputation that deterred badly needed emigrants.

The Dutch also squandered precious resources contending with the Swedes for control of the Delaware Valley to the west. The colony of New Sweden began as a scam by renegade Dutch entrepreneurs exploiting the Swedish flag to defy the monopolistic West India Company. The renegades included Peter Minuit, a disgruntled former governor of New Netherland, who lent his considerable American expertise to the New Sweden Company, chartered in 1637. Based in the west Swedish port of Gothenberg, where Dutch émigrés dominated the merchant community, the New Sweden Company sent two ships across the Atlantic under Minuit's command. After a rough crossing, they reached the Delaware River in early 1638. At the mouth of Brandywine Creek (present-day Wilmington, Delaware), the colonists established Fort Christina, named in honor of the Swedish queen. Like Fort Orange on the Hudson, Fort Christina on the Delaware specialized in the fur trade with Indians. Customers included both the Algonquian-speaking Lenni Lenape of the Delaware valley and the Iroquoian-speaking Susquehannock, who dwelled farther west in the Susquehanna Valley.

Because the trading post lost money, the Dutch investors lost interest, selling their shares to their Swedish partners and the Swedish crown. In 1643 the reorganized company reoriented the colony by dispatching farm families to raise provisions, livestock, and tobacco. Some were Swedes, but most came from Finland, then under Swedish rule. Skilled at pioneer farming in heavily forested Sweden and Finland, the colonists adapted quickly to the New World and introduced many frontier techniques that eventually became classically "American," including the construction of log cabins.

Although highly skilled, the New Sweden colonists were too few to hold the land in a violent confrontation with their Dutch neighbors. The New Swedes numbered only about three hundred men, women, and children in

September 1655 when the Dutch governor of New Netherland, Pieter Stuyvesant, appeared with seven warships and more than three hundred armed men. Bribe by the Dutch, the Swedish commander quickly surrendered and left by ship for home. Most of the colonists persisted, accepting Dutch rule. During the next decade, the Delaware settlements grew modestly to about five hundred colonists as new Dutch settlers joined the Swedes and Finns. But the Dutch colony had become stretched too thin to hold both the Delaware and the Hudson against the English.

"DUTCH" COLONISTS

The Dutch extended their religious toleration but not their republican government to New Netherland. The West India Company appointed the governor and an advisory council of leading colonists but permitted no elected assembly. Rarely even consulting the council, the governors were contentious, arbitrary, and mostly incompetent. The ablest but angriest of them, Pieter Stuyvesant, governed effectively but autocratically from 1647 to 1664. Although run by authoritarian governors, New Netherland welcomed many religious dissenters rendered unwelcome in New England, including the unfortunate Anne Hutchinson. Officially, only the Dutch Reformed Church could hold public services, but the authorities usually looked the other way at some considerable "private" meetings for worship by the many religious dissenters in the colonies: a mix of Puritans, Quakers, Lutherans, and Jews.

A zealous Calvinist, Governor Stuyvesant joined the Dutch Reformed clergy in urging a new policy meant to keep Jews as well as other Protestants out of New Netherland. But the Dutch West India Company consistently defended tolerance as best for business, reminding Stuyvesant of "the large amount of capital which [Jews] still have invested in the shares of this company." The Jews remained, enjoying more freedom in New Netherland than in any other colony.

Thanks primarily to this religious tolerance, New Netherland became the most religiously and ethnically mixed colony in North America. Indeed, the Dutch were a minority in their own colony. In 1643 a French priest visiting New Amsterdam heard eighteen different languages—some European, some Indian, and some African. New Netherland attracted emigrants from Belgium (Flemings and Walloons), France (Huguenots), Scandinavia, and, especially, Germany. The non-Dutch whites composed nearly half of the New Netherland colonists. In general, they had migrated to live and work in Holland before making the further journey across the Atlantic to New Netherland. As in New England, the emigrants were primarily family groups of modest means and farmer or artisan status, rather than the indentured, unmarried, and young men who prevailed in the early Chesapeake and West Indies. A fifth of the New Netherland colonists were dissident Puritans who

relocated from New England to settle on Long Island. And about a tenth of the inhabitants were enslaved Africans, mostly owned by the Dutch West India Company and resident in New Amsterdam, where they constructed wharves and buildings and loaded and unloaded ships. The company rewarded favored slaves with a status called "half-freedom," which permitted free movement within the colony and the rights to marry and own private property, in return for an annual payment in grain, furs, or wampum.

In New Netherland, women also enjoyed greater legal rights and economic opportunities than did their sisters in the English colonies. In contrast to English women, Dutch wives kept their maiden names, which reflected their more autonomous identity by law. Unlike the "coverture" of English common law, the Dutch legal code (derived from Roman law) did not deprive married women of their legal identity and their rights to own property. If a wife survived her husband, she received half of the property, while the other half went to their heirs—significantly better than the one-third allowed widows by English law. Most wills bestowed land or its cash value on daughters in proportions equal to sons, another marked contrast with English colonial practice, which favored males.

In New Netherland, the married couple formed an economic partnership that shared in the profits and losses. In the English colonies, men made almost all the wills and land deeds; in New Netherland, the husband and wife jointly crafted these legal documents. Although husbands usually took the lead in managing the family property, wives could make contracts, conduct commerce, and prosecute lawsuits in their own right. At New Amsterdam and Beverwyck, women ran businesses as bakers, laundresses, tavern keepers, brewers, and traders. Between 1661 and 1664, 383 women conducted or faced lawsuits in the courts at New Amsterdam. To the dismay of West India Company officials, women even aggressively participated in the fur trade. An overmatched official complained:

It happened one day that the wife of Wolfert Gerritsz came to me with [the pelts of] two otters, for which I offered her three guilders, ten stuivers. She refused this and asked for five guilders, whereupon I let her go, this being too much. The wife of Jacob Laurissz, the smith, knowing this, went to her and offered her five guilders.

The unhappy official then paid the five guilders to secure the otter pelts for the company.

Despite an appealing location and a (relatively) tolerant society, the Dutch colony failed to attract sufficient settlers to compete with its English neighbors. In 1660 New Netherland had only 5,000 colonists—better than the 3,000 in New France, but far behind the 25,000 in the Chesapeake and the 33,000 in New England. Moreover, about a fifth of the New Netherland

colonists were New English dwelling on Long Island. Far from building the security of New Netherland, the restive Long Island settlers frequently defied Dutch authority and seemed likely to help any English invasion.

Why did the colonization of New Netherland falter? In part, the colony suffered from its reputation for arbitrary government and Indian wars. In addition, the vast and rich Dutch empire provided many colonial alternatives more alluring to ambitious emigrants, especially in Ceylon, the East Indies, and Brazil. But the principal explanation is that the Netherlands had a smaller pool of potential emigrants with fewer incentives to emigrate, compared with the more numerous and more discontented English.

In mobilizing seventeenth-century emigration across the Atlantic, push was stronger than pull, and push was far stronger in England than in the Netherlands. Blessed with a booming economy and a higher standard of living, the 1.5 million Dutch had less reason to leave home than did the 5 million English, who were suffering through a painful economic transition and bitter religious strife. The Dutch lacked the masses of roaming poor who became indentured servants in the tobacco and sugar colonies established by the English in the Chesapeake and West Indies. And the tolerant Netherlands did not generate a disaffected religious minority such as the Puritans who founded New England.

The English succeeded as colonizers largely because their society was less successful at keeping people content at home. Poorer and more disaffected, the seventeenth-century English prevailed in emigrating to colonize the Atlantic seaboard of North America. But if religious conflict and economic misery sufficed to push colonial emigration, the French would have triumphed over both the English and the Dutch. The French would have tried that, unlike France, England permitted its discontented freer access to its overseas colonies and greater incentives for settling there.

Thinly populated, New Netherland proved vulnerable when the Dutch and English empires came to blows. No longer united as fellow Protestants against the superior power of Spain, the English and Dutch became violent rivals in global commerce during the 1650s and 1660s. As the English aggressively pressed their own armed trading ships into the oceans around Africa and India, they rankled the Dutch. In 1658, English sea captains complained to Parliament, "The Dutch . . . refuse to sell us a hogshead of water to refresh us at sea, and call us 'English Dogs,' which doth much grieve our English spirits." The rulers of England also resented that the more efficient Dutch shippers had captured most of the lucrative trades exporting tobacco and sugar from the English colonies in the Chesapeake and West Indies. To maximize their own profits, the tobacco and sugar planters preferred Dutch shippers, who charged 33 percent less than their English competitors. To curtail the Dutch colonial carrying trade, the English Parliament adopted a provocative and imperialist program known as the Navigation Acts.

NAVIGATION ACTS

Dutch success taught the English that an expanding colonial commerce depended on naval power and that naval might hinged upon the revenues collected from overseas trade. In 1672 an English pamphleteer explained, "The undoubted Interest of England is Trade, since it is that alone which can make us either *Rich* or *Safe*, for without a powerful Navy, we should be a prey to our Neighbours, and without Trade, we could have neither sea-men [n]or Ships." To obtain more sailors, ships, and trade, Parliament enacted a protectionist system, the Navigation Acts.

Begun in 1651 and strengthened in 1660 and 1663, the Navigation Acts had three fundamental principles. First, only English ships could trade with any English colony. The acts defined as English any ship built within the empire, owned and captained by an English subject, and sailed by a crew at least three-quarters English. Because the colonists were English subjects, their ships and sailors fell within the definition. Any trade open to the merchants and mariners of the mother country was equally open to the colonists. Second, the acts specified that a few "enumerated commodities" produced in the colonies could be shipped only to the mother country. The acts enumerated those commodities that yielded the greatest profit to merchants and the highest revenues to the customs: primarily tobacco and sugar. Colonial ships were free to take their other produce where they wanted. Third, the acts stipulated that all European goods carried to the colonies had to pass through an English port, where they paid customs duties. If a Virginian wanted a bottle of French wine, it had to come via England, rather than direct from France. Violators of the acts risked the confiscation of their ships and cargos.

In sum, the Navigation Acts sought to enhance customs revenue collected in England, increase the flow of commerce enriching English merchants, stimulate English shipbuilding, and maximize the number of English sailors, swelling the reserve for the royal navy. The Navigation Acts expressed the "mercantilist" political economy that prevailed in seventeenth-century Europe. According to the mercantilist view, the government had every right, indeed the duty, to shape the economy to serve its needs for more revenue, ships, and men for use in war to drive other nations out of overseas markets. Assuming a chronic state of economic war, mercantilism considered all other nations as competing for the same limited quantity of trade.

Enforced by an expanding navy and a more diligent customs service, the Navigation Acts promoted the dramatic growth of English overseas commerce. English merchant shipping more than doubled, from 150,000 tons in 1640 to about 340,000 in 1686. In 1600, England had been an insular and agricultural nation, trading primarily with nearby northern Europe. By 1700,

England's commerce was complex and global, as London competed successfully with Amsterdam for American produce and Asian luxuries. In 1600, English trade beyond Europe was negligible; by 1700 the American and Asian trades employed over two-fifths of English tonnage. Except for the Dutch, no other European nation depended on foreign trade for such a high proportion of its employment and gross national product.

The expansion of transoceanic trade had powerful multiplier effects upon the English and colonial economies. The larger merchant marine supported at least fifteen thousand sailors, many of them colonists. Increased shipping meant more shipbuilding, which employed more skilled artisans, including shipwrights, carpenters, blacksmiths, sailmakers, rope-makers, and gunsmiths. And maritime trade stimulated the urban construction trades that built or repaired wharves, storehouses, and the offices and homes of merchants. In addition, provisioning ships for long voyages encouraged commercial agriculture, while overseas markets stimulated demand for English manufactures, especially cloth and metal goods.

CONQUEST

To defend their commercial primacy, the Dutch waged three wars against English enforcement of the Navigation Acts: in 1652-54, 1664-67, and 1672-74. Fought primarily at sea and to a draw, the wars failed to change English colonial policy, a persistence that rendered England stronger and the Dutch weaker over time.

In 1664 the English instigated the second war by sending an expedition to conquer New Netherland. King Charles II meant to eliminate New Amsterdam as a base for the Dutch shippers who traded with Virginia, to capture the valuable fur trade conducted on the upper Hudson, to intimidate the wayward New England colonies nearby, and to erase New Netherland as an obstruction between the Chesapeake and New England colonies. The king also wanted to reward his younger brother James Stuart, the Duke of York, with possession of the conquest as a proprietary colony. For a pretext, the invaders claimed that New Netherland was an intrusion on land previously explored and claimed by the English. But the blunt Duke of Albemarle urged the rest of the English cabinet to dispense with pretext: "What matters this or that reason? What we want is more of the trade the Dutch now have."

Taken by surprise in the undeclared war, New Netherland could not resist the arrival of three English warships bearing three hundred soldiers commanded by Colonel Richard Nichols. The invaders also rallied the New English militia of Long Island, who rebelled against Dutch rule and marched on New Amsterdam. Fearing the destruction of their town and property, the intimidated Dutch refused to fight, obliging the enraged Governor Stuyvesant to surrender. Nichols sent a subordinate with a smaller English

force to seize the Delaware Valley. Confronting and overcoming more resistance there, the English plundered indiscriminately and sold the captured Dutch garrison into servitude in Virginia.

In a 1667 peace treaty, the Dutch formally gave New Netherland to the English. In a renewed war in 1673, the Dutch briefly recaptured their colony, but they surrendered it for good a year later. The Dutch colony of New Netherland became the English colony of New York; New Amsterdam became New York City; and Beverwyck and Fort Orange became known as Albany. Victory secured to the English the entire Atlantic seaboard between Florida and Acadia.

The generous terms of the 1664 capitulation freed the Dutch colonists from fighting against the Netherlands in any renewed war and permitted them to retain their properties, their inheritance laws, and their Dutch Reformed Church. But when some of the colonists welcomed and assisted the brief Dutch reconquest of 1673, the English voided the guarantees and ruled more arbitrarily. In 1675, Governor Edmund Andros imposed the English common law, forbade the use of Dutch in the courts, excluded Dutch colonists from his administration, and required all men to take an oath of allegiance. When eight Dutch leaders protested, Andros jailed them and confiscated their property. The protestors capitulated, taking the offensive oaths of allegiance to recover their freedom and two-thirds of their property. The Dutch also resented the English troops posted at New York, Esopus, and Albany, where undisciplined soldiers robbed and assaulted the colonists with apparent impunity.

The imposition of English common law eroded the opportunities for Dutch colonial women to hold, manage, and dispose of property. As they became legally "covered" by their husbands' identity, Dutch women dwindled as entrepreneurs, litigants, and testators. During the early 1660s about forty-six women conducted commerce in their own names at Beverwyck; none did so in the Albany of 1700. Gradually Dutch parents ceased providing land to most daughters, reserving all inheritance in real estate to their sons, as was the practice in the other English colonies. The widow's share of an inheritance also declined from the Dutch half to the English third, and she became more encumbered in her management and disposal of that share.

Except where obliged by the new legal system, the Dutch resisted assimilation to English culture. Indeed, the previously polyglot ethnic groups of New Netherland rallied around a Dutch identity and the Dutch language, strengthening support for the Dutch Reformed Church as a cultural haven from the English-dominated government. During the first decades of English rule, the colonists became more alike and more Dutch than they ever had been under direct Dutch rule. In 1699, more than thirty years after the conquest, the leading Anglicans of New York noted that the colony "seemed rather like a conquered Foreign Province held by the terror of a Garrison,

than an English Colony, possessed and settled by a people of our own Nation." Not until the mid-eighteenth century did most of the Dutch colonists begin to adopt the English language and English customs.

COVENANT CHAIN

By conquering New Netherland, the English replaced the Dutch in their alliance and trade with the Iroquois Five Nations, particularly the Mohawk, who lived nearest Albany, which became the most strategic place along the frontier of English America. A center for the fur trade and Indian diplomacy, Albany also lay at a critical juncture along the primary invasion corridor between New York and New France. A Massachusetts governor noted, "Albany is the Dam, which should it, through neglect, be broken down by the weight of the Enemy, we dread to think of the Inundation of Calamities that would quickly follow thereupon." After 1664, Albany's fur trade competition with Montreal merged into both the imperial rivalry between England and France for commercial dominance and the Iroquois' struggle to maintain their edge in a violent and disrupted world of native peoples.

At first, the English bitterly disappointed the Iroquois, who needed an active ally to counteract New France. During the 1660s and 1670s, the English crown avoided conflict with France, preferring to fight the Dutch. The English and the Dutch wars disrupted the supply, and enhanced the prices, of goods at Albany, to the Iroquois' dismay. Worse still, the Albany colonists failed to help defend the Mohawk against a destructive raid by the French and their Indian allies in 1666.

Obligated to make a humiliating peace, the Iroquois accepted French Jesuit missionaries in 1667. As with the Huron of the 1630s, the French employed the Jesuits to convert the Iroquois into French allies as well as Catholic believers. And as with the Huron, the missionaries bitterly divided the Iroquois. Traditionalists charged that the Jesuits weakened the Iroquois from within, sabotaging the warrior ethos, spiritual knowledge, ritual exercise, and political unity that together constituted Five Nation power. During the late 1670s and early 1680s the traditionalists drove the Jesuits and their converts out of Iroquoia to French Canada, where they resettled in mission villages at Kahnawake and Oka, both near Montreal.

The Iroquois traditionalists acted from a renewed confidence in Albany as a source of trade and a base for allies. After 1674, peace between the Dutch and the English permitted trade goods to reach Albany more safely and abundantly. And New York's ambitious new governor, Edmund Andros, aggressively cultivated the Five Nations and cleverly embraced their pretensions to have conquered the Ohio Valley and the Great Lakes country. By claiming authority over the Iroquois, Andros insisted that the English empire

owned their western conquests by proxy—which the French, of course, bitterly disputed.

Andros also recruited the Five Nations to intimidate coastal Algonquian peoples who resisted English colonial expansion. The English and the Iroquois framed an alliance called the Covenant Chain, which invited the Five Nations to dominate the other native peoples in the northeast. In sum, the Five Nations (especially the Mohawk) and the English collaborated to build their respective power, at the expense of weaker Indians. Whenever English colonial governors wanted coastal Algonquians threatened or relocated, they lavished praise and presents on Five Nation chiefs, who then mobilized their warriors as enforcers. In addition to procuring flattery and presents, the Iroquois settled some old scores against the Algonquians and obliged many to become their dependents dwelling on the margins of Iroquoia as a security buffer. For example, in 1676 Andros persuaded Mohawk warriors to attack the New England Algonquian peoples, turning the tide of King Philip's War in favor of the colonists. The Mohawk resettled many of the defeated Algonquians northeast of Albany, to shield their frontier against renewed French attacks.

Emboldened by the ouster of the Jesuits and by the Covenant Chain alliance, during the early 1680s the Iroquois resumed their attacks on the French and their western Indian allies, especially in the Illinois country. Contrary to French suspicions, the English authorities in New York did not directly encourage the Iroquois attacks, for England remained officially at peace with France. But, as the French noted, the Iroquois could not have resumed western hostilities without confidence in their trade for guns and ammunition at Albany.

After initial success, the Iroquois war parties suffered heavy losses against stiff resistance by their well-armed western foes, especially during 1683 and 1684. Worse still, in 1687 a mixed force of French soldiers, Canadian militia, and western Indians invaded Iroquoia, looting and burning four Seneca villages. Over the smoldering ruins the French commander provocatively erected the coat of arms of his king, Louis XIV, to represent France's claim to command the Iroquois and their country. Thomas Dongan, Andros's successor as governor of New York, could only stew in frustration, for he lacked the means and the authority from his home government to fight the French. To their dismay, the Iroquois discovered that the New Yorkers honored the Covenant Chain alliance only when convenient.

NEW JERSEY

In principle, King Charles II and the Duke of York wanted to strengthen crown control over all of the English colonies, the better to tax their growing

commerce. In practice, however, the Smart brothers compounded the political complexity of the empire by awarding new proprietary colonies in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the Carolinas to reward English aristocrats and gentlemen, as payoffs for political favors and cash debts.

In 1664 the Duke of York granted the lands between the Hudson and the Delaware rivers as a distinct new colony called New Jersey. He awarded New Jersey to two English noblemen to further his political interests, but in 1671 and 1682 they sold out to two sets of investors, one Scottish and the other led by English Quakers. The purchasers divided New Jersey into two still smaller colonies, East and West Jersey (about 3,000 and 4,600 square miles respectively). The Scots took East Jersey, near New York, while the Quakers obtained West Jersey, along the Delaware.

Both sets of proprietors recruited farmers to clear and cultivate the land which would enable them to pay annual quitrents. To attract colonists, the proprietors promised religious toleration to all Protestants and an elected assembly to share governance with an appointed governor and council. The incentives hastened development, pushing the population of the two Jerseys to fourteen thousand by 1700.

English Quakers primarily colonized West Jersey, while East Jersey became especially multiethnic. Some Dutch farmers had settled in East Jersey before the conquest of 1664, and more emigrated there during the 1670s and 1680s to escape oversight by the English officials in New York. East Jersey also attracted Puritans from New England, seeking larger and more fertile farms. Gathering in their own towns, the New English dwelled apart from the older Dutch settlements. The Scottish proprietors also recruited about six hundred of their countrymen as colonists. Clustering together, the Scots kept their distance from both the Dutch and the New English. The different ethnic mixes in the two Jerseys produced distinctive political polarities, but a similar contentiousness along ethnic and religious lines. In 1703 an imperial official explained, "The Contests of West Jersey have always been betwixt the Quakers and her majesty's subjects that are no Quakers. . . . The contest in East Jersey is of a different nature, whether the country shall be a Scotch settlement or an English settlement."

In 1702 the crown reunited East and West Jersey as the royal colony of New Jersey. While surrendering their rights of government, the East and West Jersey proprietors retained legal title to all frontier lands for their future sale and profit. The greedy demands of the East Jersey proprietors provoked several generations of riots by settlers determined to hold their lands by some cheaper title. Relatively small and poor, New Jersey remained economically dominated and politically overshadowed by its wealthier, more numerous, and more powerful two neighbors: New York to the northeast and Pennsylvania to the southwest.

PENNSYLVANIA

West Jersey's Quaker proprietors included William Penn (1644-1718), who developed a grand ambition to procure his own, larger colony. To cancel a debt of £16,000 owed to Penn's late father, Admiral William Penn, the king agreed in 1680 to grant the younger Penn 45,000 square miles west of the Delaware River as the colony of Pennsylvania ("Penn's Woods"). In 1682 the Duke of York also assigned to Penn the old Swedish-Finnish-Dutch settlements on the lower Delaware River (the future colony and state of Delaware).

A paradoxical man, William Penn combined an elite status with a radical religion. As Admiral Penn's son and heir, William Penn enjoyed a university education and large landed estates in Ireland and England. His annual income of £2,000 placed Penn near the top of the gentry class. He lived in a grand country house in Sussex, wore expensive clothing with silver buckles, ate and drank abundantly well, kept three coaches, and employed a staff of eight servants. In his colony, he also acquired several slaves. His genteel manners and considerable wealth afforded Penn the political influence and social privileges of a prominent and well-connected courtier. But as a young man and against his father's wishes, Penn had converted to Quakerism, then an especially mystical, radical, and persecuted form of Protestantism. As a wealthy gentleman, Penn was an unusual Quaker, for most were tradesmen, shopkeepers, and small farmers, who distrusted conspicuous wealth and state power. In turn, the rich and powerful of the realm generally despised the Quakers.

Numbering about fifty thousand in Great Britain in 1680, the Quakers called themselves simply the Friends of God, but their opponents called them Quakers, because one had said that they quaked before the power of God. Inspired especially by the preaching of George Fox, the Quakers became numerous and controversial in England during the 1650s. Quakers carried the Puritan critiques of church hierarchy and ritual to their ultimate conclusion: a rejection of all sacraments, liturgies, and paid intermediaries—ministers as well as bishops—between a soul and God. Renouncing formal prayers, sermons, and ceremony of any sort, Quakers met together as spiritual equals and sat silently until the divine spirit inspired someone, anyone, to speak. Although they rejected a specially educated and salaried ministry, certain especially devout and articulate laymen (and women) served as "Public Friends," itinerant preachers supported by voluntary contributions.

In contrast to the Puritan emphasis on sacred scripture, Quakers primarily relied on mystical experience to find and know God. The Quakers sought an "Inner Light" to understand the Bible, which they read allegorically rather than literally. More than a distant divinity or an ancient person, their Jesus Christ was fundamentally here and now and eternal: the Holy

Spirit potentially dwelling within every person. Anyone truly awakened by that Spirit could thereafter live in sanctity.

By seventeenth-century standards, Quaker religious beliefs led to radical social conclusions. Insisting upon the equality of all persons before God, Quakers tried to dispense with the markers of social hierarchy. They wore plain clothes; refused to take oaths of allegiance or for testimony; rejected the payment of church tithes; used plain, familiar language with all people, even to address aristocrats or the king; and declined to doff their hats before their rulers as a conventional sign of respect. Considering women spiritually equal to men, Quakers established parallel men's and women's leadership for their meetings. Matrons exercised important powers within the Quaker meetings by guiding and disciplining the younger women and by regulating marriages. Pacifists, the Quakers refused to bear arms. Uneasy with slavery, most sought at least its amelioration, and some became the first people to urge its abolition.

Quakers were most radical during their early years, the 1650s, when the Puritans tried and failed to govern England as a republic. Especially zealous Friends disrupted Anglican and Puritan religious services, inviting prosecution and martyrdom to prove their convictions. By challenging political hierarchy and formal churches, the early Quakers meant to hasten the advent of Christ's millennial rule on earth. But, instead of the Millennium, the 1660s brought the Restoration of the king and a more systematic persecution of the Quakers. Local magistrates jailed, whipped, and fined thousands of Quakers for refusing oaths of allegiance, evading church tithes, or publishing their unorthodox ideas. Convicted four times for preaching or writing his beliefs, William Penn spent about half of the years 1667-71 behind bars.

Penn was both a devout Quaker and an ingrained elitist, both highly principled and habitually condescending. A tireless crusader for religious toleration, Penn traveled widely as a preacher, in Germany and Holland as well as Great Britain. He hosted Quaker meetings at his estate, published more than fifty devotional or polemical tracts, defended Quakers in the courts, and tirelessly lobbied the crown to liberate jailed Friends. For his expensive exertions, Penn expected honor and obedience from his social inferiors—which meant all other Quakers. Easily disappointed, Penn often wallowed in self-pity, styling himself misunderstood and unappreciated by many common Friends.

A relatively late Quaker, Penn converted in 1667, when the Quaker zeal was moderating, a trend that he furthered. Quakerism became more respectable after 1670, as many Friends prospered and as some wealthy merchants and gentry converted to that faith. Like the Puritans, the Quakers practiced the temperance, thrift, and exertion that enabled common men to accumulate prosperity and even wealth. Prosperity then gradually took the edge off their radicalism. Known as "weighty Friends," the wealthy Quakers helped by subsidizing meetings, preaching, publications, and legal defense

inds, but their worldly ways compromised the Quaker commitment to a plain style, egalitarian manners, and spiritual spontaneity. To achieve greater discipline and uniformity, during the 1670s the Friends developed a network of local Monthly Meetings, which reported to regional Quarterly Meetings, and ultimately to the annual London Meeting.

As the Quakers became more respectable and moderate, they lowered their expectations and shifted their strategy away from provoking the Millenium in favor of securing a legally protected position as a permanent minority. Led by William Penn, the Quakers urged a national tolerance for all Protestant denominations as legal equals. This Quaker vision of Protestant pluralism and tolerance horrified the Anglican authorities as the road to theism via anarchy. An Anglican clergyman reasoned that "to tolerate all [faiths] without controul is the way to have none at all."

But the Quaker cause found a powerful ally in the Duke of York, who became King James II in 1685. Although the legal head of the Church of England, James was a Catholic and so, like William Penn, a religious outsider in an officially Anglican nation. To emancipate Catholics from legal and political discrimination, James sought common cause with the dissenting Protestants, including Quakers, by announcing a new policy of toleration. The Anglican establishment was bitterly opposed, and most Puritans balked from fear of Catholicism and suspicion of the king's authoritarian motives. But Penn enthusiastically supported the king and his program. In return, James bought Penn's advice and encouraged his political activism.

Penn's plans for Pennsylvania expressed his double position as a Quaker and a gentleman, bent on sustaining his own fortune while benefiting his persecuted faith. Putting a Quaker twist on the Puritan concept of a colony is a "City upon a Hill," Penn spoke of Pennsylvania as a "holy experiment" and an "example to the Nations." But in stark contrast to Puritan Massachusetts, Pennsylvania would have no privileged church, no tax-supported religious establishment, not even for the Friends. Penn certainly meant to provide a haven for his persecuted people, but he spoke in universalistic terms of "a Free Colony for all Mankind that should go hither." In addition to recruiting Quakers from throughout the British Isles, Penn welcomed both non-Quakers and non-Britons, promising them all equal rights and opportunities.

Penn's financial interest also argued for hastening development by welcoming every productive emigrant. In founding a colony, Penn meant to enhance rather than to sacrifice his fortune. In promising a "Free Colony," he did not offer free land, for he meant to profit by selling real estate and by collecting annual quitrents. He explained, "Though I desire to extend religious freedom, yet I want some recompense for my trouble." To share the costs and risks of his colony, Penn needed other investors, primarily fellow Quakers who also wished to do well by doing good. During the early 1680s

at least six hundred men subscribed for over 750,000 acres, raising about £9,000, which Penn needed to finance his new colony. About half of the investors eventually emigrated to Pennsylvania; the rest remained absentee speculators.

Masterfully employing that seed capital, Penn organized the fastest and most efficient colonization in the seventeenth-century English empire. During 1682, twenty-three ships from England reached the Delaware River, bearing about two thousand colonists and their tools, clothes, provisions, and livestock. A year later, twenty more ships brought another two thousand immigrants. By 1686, Pennsylvania's population exceeded eight thousand.

Most of the colonists settled along the western shore of the Delaware River just above the small, older settlements of New Sweden. At the juncture of the Schuylkill River with the Delaware, Penn established a city and capital named Philadelphia—"City of Brotherly Love." He designed a systematic grid of broad streets with spacious parks, an arrangement that distinguished Philadelphia from older colonial towns, like Boston or Bridgetown, with their rambling and narrow streets, crowded buildings, and frequent fires. Within two years, the instant city of Philadelphia had about 350 houses and 2,500 inhabitants.

Like the New England Puritans—but unlike the Chesapeake colonists—most early Pennsylvanians came in freedom as families of middling means. Only about a third of the early settlers were indentured. Most emigrants were Quakers, primarily from England, but many came from Ireland and Wales. The colony also attracted English Anglicans, German Pietists, and Dutch Calvinists. Most settled as farmers in the many rural townships, but some lingered in Philadelphia as artisans and merchants. The merchants tended to be "weighty Friends" with sound credit, sober reputations, and extensive trade contacts throughout the empire. Their shared faith endowed the far-flung Quaker merchants with a mutual trust that afforded a critical advantage in the competitive conduct of long-distance commerce. During the eighteenth century, Philadelphia's merchant community became the wealthiest in the colonies, providing Pennsylvania with an elite more like commercial New England than the planter Chesapeake.

Pennsylvania proved an ideal setting for colonial settlement by family farmers producing grains and livestock for the transatlantic market (and for merchants exporting that produce). The Delaware River offered cheap and easy transportation from the new farms to the port of Philadelphia. In contrast to rocky New England, southeastern Pennsylvania possessed a fertile soil and an easily tilled landscape of low, rolling hills. The new colony also enjoyed a relatively long growing season of 180 days, which offered a greater certainty that grains would ripen before the first killing frost of autumn. But that growing season was not long enough to tempt most colonists to compete with the Chesapeake in raising tobacco—a temptation that would have led to

poor country, be not so Governmentish, so noisy and open in your dissatisfactions." A year later Penn sighed in frustration that there was "nothing but good said of the place, and little that's good said of the people."

One factional divide set the older, non-Quaker settlements of the lower Delaware (the three "Lower Counties") against the more numerous and mostly Quaker newcomers dwelling upriver in the three "Upper Counties." The Swedes, Finns, Dutch, and Anglicans of the Lower Counties resented political domination by the Quaker newcomers, and they feared the economic decline of their downriver ports as Philadelphia became the regional entrepôt. More vulnerable to French and pirate attacks by sea, the Lower Counties also demanded defense appropriations to arm their militia and strengthen their coastal fortifications. But the Quaker assemblymen balked, for their constituents were more securely located upriver, committed to pacifism, and determined to minimize their taxes. Unable to reconcile the two regions, Penn consented to their division in 1704 into the distinct colonies of Pennsylvania and Delaware, with separate legislatures but a common governor appointed by their proprietor.

A second factional divide erupted within the Quaker ranks during the early 1690s. Although contrary to the Quaker love of peace, the rancorous squabbling derived from the righteous assertion that characterized a people who had so long defied authority to defend their principles. Compelled to unite in England against their persecutors, the Quakers felt liberated in Pennsylvania to discover and exercise their theological differences, just as the Puritans had done in New England during the 1630s. In early 1693 rival factions seized opposite ends of the main Quaker meetinghouse in Philadelphia, erecting polarized galleries for their competing speakers. Instead of offering peace and meditation, the next Quaker meeting became a shouting contest that culminated in violence as each side took up axes to smash the other's gallery. Fortunately for Quaker harmony, the division healed in 1694 when the leader of one faction, George Keith, abruptly departed for England.

William Penn's sweeping claims to power provoked a third and more persistent division. Most colonists, Quaker and non-Quaker and in both the Lower and Upper Counties, chafed under Penn's patronizing authority, his apparent greed, and his capricious inconsistency. As the opposition saw it, Penn fleeced and restricted most of the colonists to further enrich himself and his official circle of cronies. The dissidents complained that although Penn denounced land speculation and favored close settlement, he reserved large tracts for himself or bestowed them upon his favorites.

In 1684, Penn departed Pennsylvania and returned to England, where he remained until 1699. During his long absence, his critics dominated the colonial assembly and council. They generally defied Penn's deputy governor, refused to pay their quitrents, and ignored Penn's letters of instruction. "After they are Read, there is no more notice taken of them," a loyal councilor reported in 1686. Feeling betrayed, Penn denounced his opponents as

selfish ingrates indifferent to his extraordinary expenses and exertions in securing and colonizing Pennsylvania. He certainly needed the revenue from land sales and quitrents. Living beyond his means and donating generously to support Quaker meetings and Public Friends, Penn accumulated the debts that would consign him to an English debtors' prison in 1707.

DIVERSITY

Colonial empires sowed unintended and paradoxical consequences maddening to their rulers. In 1664 the English conquered the mid-Atlantic seaboard to consolidate a more homogeneous and docile empire stretching from Carolina to Canada. But that conquest absorbed a medley of non-English peoples: Dutch, Swedes, Finns, Walloons, Flemings, Huguenots, Germans, and Norwegians. This diversity contrasted markedly with both the Chesapeake and New England, where almost all of the white colonists came from England. That diversity also violated the traditional English conviction that social cohesion and political order depended on ethnic and religious uniformity. In 1692 an English New Yorker lamented, "Our chiefest unhappyness here is too great a mixture of nations, and English the least part." Xenophobic English officials did not adjust easily to the diversity of their new subjects.

The English conquest only compounded the region's ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity as the victors created the new colonies of New Jersey and Pennsylvania, which attracted more non-English emigrants. That very diversity became the defining characteristic of the middle colonies, the collective name for New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania because they lay between the Chesapeake and New England. In the early eighteenth century, the middle colonists included Anglicans (mostly English), Presbyterians (Scots and Scotch-Irish), Congregationalists (relocated New English Puritans), Quakers (English and Welsh), Reformed (Dutch and German), Lutherans (the Scandinavians and some Germans), an array of pietistic sects (German and Swiss), and a few Catholics (primarily Irish) and Jews (from the Netherlands). In addition, most of the enslaved Africans preserved their traditional beliefs, which remained mysterious to their indifferent masters. Neither any single ethnic group nor any particular religious denomination enjoyed a majority in any middle colony.

Conventional political wisdom insisted that a polity should be organic and tradition-bound: a unified body of unequal parts ruled by a natural elite guided by long precedent. Defying those expectations, the middle colonies were new societies composed of diverse peoples who could not agree to give deference to a shared elite. Instead, ethnocultural groups were openly contentious and disrespectful of authorities, even within their own communities. In 1704, William Penn complained that the Pennsylvania colonists needed "to be humbled and made more pliable; for what with the distance and the

scarcity of mankind there, they opine too much." In the mid-eighteenth century, a German immigrant reported, "They have a saying here: Pennsylvania is heaven for farmers, paradise for artisans, and hell for officials and preachers."

Although engaged in especially fractious political competition, the middle colonies avoided the violence that accompanied ethnic and religious difference in Europe. The rhetorical rancor of ethnocultural politics apparently vented resentments peacefully, which precluded a resort to house burnings and murder. The combination of contention and restraint appeared in the 1764 Pennsylvania election, when Benjamin Franklin criticized the bloc voting by German voters as "the Palatine Boors herding together." His opponents freely translated Franklin's words into the German complaint "that I call'd them a Herd of Hogs." Turning out in unprecedented numbers, the Germans ensured Franklin's defeat—but no one died or lost their home to a riot.

The middle colonies defined a distinctive culture and social order that precociously anticipated the American future. But the fractious diversity of the middle colonies also frustrated English visions of an empire responsive to command, especially during war. The middle colonies contributed little to an empire increasingly embroiled in massive conflicts with France.

Part III



EMPIRES