

AP Gov't Summer Reading Assignment 2015-2016

- As a student in AP government, you will be expected to come prepared to class every day. To ensure that you are ready for the first days of class, I have created the following summer assignment. This will be collected, in its entirety, the **second** day of class (**REGARDLESS OF FIRST OR SECOND SEMESTER**). The assignment will count for a 57% grade. Late work will be penalized. This assignment can be typed, however: **ALL PAPERS SHOULD BE INDEPENDENT WORK...PAPERS THAT ARE TOO SIMILAR IN WORDING TO SOMEONE ELSE'S PAPER WILL BE SCRUTINIZED FOR PLAGARISM—DO YOUR OWN WORK!!!**

There are 3 parts to the summer reading assignment:

Part I: Read The Politically Incorrect Guide to The Founding Fathers by Brion McClanahan, Ph.D. ISBN # 978-1-59698-092-1

Write a summary of the first 3 chapters of the book in Part I. Your summary should include the author's point of view of what is considered politically incorrect about the founders and their attitudes and actions. (Write in 3rd person)

For Part II...what myths or misconceptions have you learned about each of the Big Six in past history classes and how does this differ to the author's politically incorrect point of view of the each of them?

For Part III. Pick 5 of the "Forgotten Founders" and write a short interpretation of the author's point of view of their contributions.

Part II: Excerpts and Summaries from primary documents

Part III: Read the following excerpts and summaries from the primary documents provided and answer the following questions using complete sentences:

A: Jean-Jacques Rousseau *Social Contract* Reading Questions:

1. What does this mean "Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains"?
2. Who are the first societies that shape governmental leadership? Are these relationships voluntary or involuntary? Explain.
3. What rights do the strongest members of society have?
4. What problem is associated with government? How does the Social Contract solve the problems of government?
5. Who are the sovereign and what happens if they break the social contract?
6. What is the civil state? What does Rousseau state that the people must give up to this civil state and what do they get in return?

Jean-Jacques Rousseau

BOOK I

I MEAN to inquire if, in the civil order, there can be any sure and legitimate rule of administration, men being taken as they are and laws as they might be. In this inquiry I shall endeavour always to unite what right sanctions with what is prescribed by interest, in order that justice and utility may in no case be divided.

I enter upon my task without proving the importance of the subject. I shall be asked if I am a prince or a legislator, to write on politics. I answer that I am neither, and that is why I do so. If I were a prince or a legislator, I should not waste time in saying what wants doing; I should do it, or hold my peace.

As I was born a citizen of a free State, and a member of the Sovereign, I feel that, however feeble the influence my voice can have on public affairs, the right of voting on them makes it my duty to study them: and I am happy, when I reflect upon governments, to find my inquiries always furnish me with new reasons for loving that of my own country.

1. SUBJECT OF THE FIRST BOOK

MAN is born free; and everywhere he is in chains. One thinks himself the master of others, and still remains a greater slave than they. How did this change come about? I do not know. What can make it legitimate? That question I think I can answer.

If I took into account only force, and the effects derived from it, I should say: "As long as a people is compelled to obey, and obeys, it does well; as soon as it can shake off the yoke, and shakes it off, it does still better; for, regaining its liberty by the same right as took

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it away, either it is justified in resuming it, or there was no justification for those who took it away." But the social order is a sacred right which is the basis of all other rights. Nevertheless, this right does not come from nature, and must therefore be founded on conventions. Before coming to that, I have to prove what I have just asserted.

2. THE FIRST SOCIETIES

THE most ancient of all societies, and the only one that is natural, is the family: and even so the children remain attached to the father only so long as they need him for their preservation. As soon as this need ceases, the natural bond is dissolved. The children, released from the obedience they owed to the father, and the father, released from the care he owed his children, return equally to independence. If they remain united, they continue so no longer naturally, but voluntarily; and the family itself is then maintained only by convention.

This common liberty results from the nature of man. His first law is to provide for his own preservation, his first cares are those which he owes to himself; and, as soon as he reaches years of discretion, he is the sole judge of the proper means of preserving himself, and consequently becomes his own master.

The family then may be called the first model of political societies: the ruler corresponds to the father, and the people to the children; and all, being born free and equal, alienate their liberty only for their own advantage. The whole difference is that, in the family, the love of the father for his children repays him for the care he takes of them, while, in the State, the pleasure of commanding takes the place of the love which the chief cannot have for the peoples under him.

3. THE RIGHT OF THE STRONGEST

THE strongest is never strong enough to be always the master, unless he transforms strength into right, and obedience into duty. Hence the right of the strongest, which, though to all seeming meant ironically, is really laid down as a fundamental principle. But are we never to have an explanation of this phrase? Force is a physical power, and I fail to see what moral effect it can have. To yield to force is an act of necessity, not of will — at the most, an act of prudence. In what sense can it be a duty?

Suppose for a moment that this so-called "right" exists. I maintain that the sole result is a mass of inexplicable nonsense. For, if force creates right, the effect changes with the cause: every force that is greater than the first succeeds to its right. As soon as it is possible to disobey with impunity, disobedience is legitimate; and, the strongest being always in the right, the only thing that matters is to act so as to become the strongest. But what kind of right is that which perishes when force fails? If we must obey perforce, there is no need to obey because we ought; and if we are not forced to obey, we are under no obligation to do so. Clearly, the word "right" adds nothing to force: in this connection, it means absolutely nothing.

Obey the powers that be. If this means yield to force, it is a good precept, but superfluous: I can answer for its never being violated. All power comes from God, I admit; but so does all sickness: does that mean that we are forbidden to call in the doctor? A brigand surprises me at the edge of a wood: must I not merely surrender my purse on compulsion; but, even if I could withhold it, am I in conscience bound to give it up? For certainly the pistol he holds is also a power.

Let us then admit that force does not create right, and that we are obliged to obey only legitimate powers. In that case, my original question recurs.

6. THE SOCIAL COMPACT

I SUPPOSE men to have reached the point at which the obstacles in the way of their preservation in the state of nature show their power of resistance to be greater than the resources at the disposal of each individual for his maintenance in that state. That primitive condition can then subsist no longer; and the human race would perish unless it changed its manner of existence.

But, as men cannot engender new forces, but only unite and direct existing ones, they have no other means of preserving themselves than the formation, by aggregation, of a sum of forces great enough to overcome the resistance. These they have to bring into play by means of a single motive power, and cause to act in concert.

This sum of forces can arise only where several persons come together: but, as the force and liberty of each man are the chief instruments of his self-preservation, how can he pledge them without harming his own interests, and neglecting the care he owes to himself? This difficulty, in its bearing on my present subject, may be stated in the following terms:

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"The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before." This is the fundamental problem of which the *Social Contract* provides the solution.

The clauses of this contract are so determined by the nature of the act that the slightest modification would make them vain and ineffective; so that, although they have perhaps never been formally set forth, they are everywhere the same and everywhere tacitly admitted and recognised, until, on the violation of the social compact, each regains his original rights and resumes his natural liberty, while losing the conventional liberty in favour of which he renounced it.

These clauses, properly understood, may be reduced to one — the total alienation of each associate, together with all his rights, to the whole community; for, in the first place, as each gives himself absolutely, the conditions are the same for all; and, this being so, no one has any interest in making them burdensome to others.

Moreover, the alienation being without reserve, the union is as perfect as it can be, and no associate has anything more to demand: for, if the individuals retained certain rights, as there would be no common superior to decide between them and the public, each, being on one point his own judge, would ask to be so on all; the state of nature would thus continue, and the association would necessarily become inoperative or tyrannical.

Finally, each man, in giving himself to all, gives himself to nobody; and as there is no associate over whom he does not acquire the same right as he yields others over himself, he gains an equivalent for everything he loses, and an increase of force for the preservation of what he has.

If then we discard from the social compact what is not of its essence, we shall find that it reduces itself to the following terms:

"Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole."

At once, in place of the individual personality of each contracting party, this act of association creates a moral and collective body, composed of as many members as the assembly contains votes, and receiving from this act its unity, its common identity, its life and its will. This public person, so formed by the union of all other persons formerly took the name of *city*,⁴ and now takes that of *Republic* or *body politic*; it is called by its members *State* when passive, *Sovereign* when active, and *Power* when compared with others like itself. Those who are associated in it take collectively the name of *people*, and severally are called *citizens*, as sharing in the sovereign power, and *subjects*, as being under the laws of the State. But these terms are often confused and taken one for another: it is enough to know how to distinguish them when they are being used with precision.

7. THE SOVEREIGN

THIS formula shows us that the act of association comprises a mutual undertaking between the public and the individuals, and that each individual, in making a contract, as we may say, with himself, is bound in a double capacity; as a member of the Sovereign he is bound to the individuals, and as a member of the State to the Sovereign. But the maxim of civil right, that no one is bound by undertakings made to himself, does not apply in this case; for there is a great difference between incurring an obligation to yourself and incurring one to a whole of which you form a part.

Attention must further be called to the fact that public deliberation, while competent to bind all the subjects to the Sovereign, because of the two different capacities in which each of them may be regarded, cannot, for the opposite reason, bind the Sovereign to itself; and that it is consequently against the nature of the body politic for the Sovereign to impose on itself a law which it cannot infringe. Being able to regard itself in only one capacity, it is in the position of an individual who makes a contract with himself; and this makes it clear that there neither is nor can be any kind of fundamental law binding on the body of the people — not even the social contract itself. This does not mean that the body politic cannot enter into undertakings with others, provided the contract is not infringed by them; for in relation to what is external to it, it becomes a simple being, an individual.

But the body politic or the Sovereign, drawing its being wholly from the sanctity of the contract, can never bind itself, even to an outsider, to do anything derogatory to the original act, for instance, to alienate any part of itself, or to submit to another Sovereign. Violation of the act by which it exists would be self-annihilation; and that which is itself nothing can create nothing.

As soon as this multitude is so united in one body, it is impossible to offend against one of the members without attacking the body, and still more to offend against the body without the members resenting it. Duty and interest therefore equally oblige the two contracting parties to give each other help; and the same men should seek to combine, in their double capacity, all the advantages dependent upon that capacity.

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Again, the Sovereign, being formed wholly of the individuals who compose it, neither has nor can have any interest contrary to theirs; and consequently the sovereign power need give no guarantee to its subjects, because it is impossible for the body to wish to hurt all its members. We shall also see later on that it cannot hurt any in particular. The Sovereign, merely by virtue of what it is, is always what it should be.

This, however, is not the case with the relation of the subjects to the Sovereign, which, despite the common interest, would have no security that they would fulfill their undertakings, unless it found means to assure itself of their fidelity.

In fact, each individual, as a man, may have a particular will contrary or dissimilar to the general will which he has as a citizen. His particular interest may speak to him quite differently from the common interest: his absolute and naturally independent existence may make him look upon what he owes to the common cause as a gratuitous contribution, the loss of which will do less harm to others than the payment of it is burdensome to himself; and, regarding the moral person which constitutes the State as a *persona ficta*, because not a man, he may wish to enjoy the rights of citizenship without being ready to fulfil the duties of a subject. The continuance of such an injustice could not but prove the undoing of the body politic.

In order then that the social compact may not be an empty formula, it tacitly includes the undertaking, which alone can give force to the rest, that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body. This means nothing less than that he will be forced to be free; for this is the condition which, by giving each citizen to his country, secures him against all personal dependence. In this lies the key to the working of the political machine; this alone legitimises civil undertakings, which, without it, would be absurd, tyrannical, and liable to the most frightful abuses.

8. THE CIVIL STATE

THE passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces a very remarkable change in man, by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct, and giving his actions the morality they had formerly lacked. Then only, when the voice of duty takes the place of physical impulses and right of appetite, does man, who so far had considered only himself, find that he is forced to act on different principles, and to consult his reason before listening to his inclinations. Although, in this state, he deprives himself of some advantages which he got from nature, he gains in return others so great, his faculties are so stimulated and developed, his ideas so extended, his feelings so ennobled, and his whole soul so uplifted, that, did not the abuses of this new condition often degrade him below that which he left, he would be bound to bless continually the happy moment which took him from it for ever, and, instead of a stupid and unimaginative animal, made him an intelligent being and a man.

Let us draw up the whole account in terms easily commensurable. What man loses by the social contract is his natural liberty and an unlimited right to everything he tries to get and succeeds in getting; what he gains is civil liberty and the proprietorship of all he possesses. If we are to avoid mistake in weighing one against the other, we must clearly distinguish natural liberty, which is bounded only by the strength of the individual, from civil liberty, which is limited by the general will; and possession, which is merely the effect of force or the right of the first occupier, from property, which can be founded only on a positive title.

We might, over and above all this, add, to what man acquires in the civil state, moral liberty, which alone makes him truly master of himself; for the mere impulse of appetite is slavery, while obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty. But I have already said too much on this head, and the philosophical meaning of the word liberty does not now concern us.

B. The Baron de Montesquieu *Spirit of the Laws* Reading Questions:

1. What are the main themes in the *Spirit of the Laws*? (Hint: 6 themes)
2. Define (use another source: dictionary) the three main classifications of political systems according to Montesquieu.
3. What is the distinction between a monarchy and a despotism?
4. What is "political liberty" and what is the best means of preserving it?
5. What is the "love of virtue"? the "love of honor"? and the "fear of the ruler"?
6. What happens if the above 3 principles are not met? Give an example.

The Baron de Montesquieu

The Spirit of Laws Originally published anonymously partly because Montesquieu's works were subject to censorship, its influence outside of France was aided by its rapid translation into other languages.

Montesquieu spent nearly twenty years researching and writing De l'esprit des lois (The Spirit of the Laws), covering a wide range of topics in politics, the law, sociology, and anthropology and providing more than 3,000 citations.^[1] In this political treatise Montesquieu advocates constitutionalism and the separation of powers, the abolition of slavery, the preservation of civil liberties

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and the rule of law, and the idea that political and legal institutions ought to reflect the social and geographical character of each particular community.

Constitutional theory

In its classification of kinds of political systems, Montesquieu defines three main kinds: republican, monarchical, and despotic. As he classifies them, Republican political systems vary depending on how broadly they extend citizenship rights -- those that extend citizenship relatively broadly are termed democratic republics, while those that restrict citizenship more narrowly are termed aristocratic republics. The distinction between monarchy and despotism hinges on whether or not "intermediate powers" (such as the nobility, the clergy, etc.) exist that can restrain the authority of the ruler: if so, the regime counts as a monarchy; if not, it counts as despotism. Driving each classification of political system, according to Montesquieu, must be what he calls a "principle". This *principle* acts as a spring or motor to motivate behavior on the part of the citizens in ways that will tend to support that regime and make it function smoothly. For democracies (and to a somewhat lesser extent - for republics), this spring is *the love of virtue* -- the willingness to put the interests of the community ahead of private interests. For monarchies, the spring is *the love of honor* -- the desire to attain greater rank and privilege. Finally, for despotisms, the spring is *the fear of the ruler*. A political system cannot last if its appropriate principle is lacking. Montesquieu claims, for example, that the English failed to establish a republic after the Civil War (1642–1651) because the society lacked the (democratic) requisite: the love of virtue.

Liberty and the separation of powers

A second major theme in *De l'esprit des lois* concerns "political liberty" and the best means of preserving it. "Political liberty" is Montesquieu's concept of what we might call today personal security, especially insofar as this is provided for through a system of dependable and moderate laws. He distinguishes this view of liberty from two other, misleading views of political liberty. The first is the view that liberty consists in collective self-government. The second is the view that liberty consists in being able to do whatever one wants without constraint. Not only are these latter two not genuine political liberty, he thinks, they can both be hostile to it. Political liberty is not possible in a despotic political system, but it is possible, though not guaranteed, in republics and monarchies.

John Locke

C. John Locke *Two Treatises of Government* Reading Questions:

1. What is the purpose and main content of the First Treatise of Government?
2. How does Locke use the Bible as a reference for his point in the First Treatise of Government?
3. What is the "state of nature" according to Locke? Why are men not free to do whatever they please?
4. What is Locke's position on slavery? Why was he called a hypocrite in this regard?
5. What is Locke's position on the protection of personal property? Should the government play a role in this?
6. If Locke did not call for a democracy, then what did he call for? How is this different from a democracy?
7. Do the people have the right of rebellion? In what instances?

"John Locke's 1690 book is one of the most important and influential works on government ever published. The first part demolishes the main authoritarian/totalitarian ideology of its day: the doctrine of the divine right of kings to absolute arbitrary power over their subjects. The second sets out the real social origins, functions, and limits of government. Locke demonstrates that far from God and natural law ordaining all-powerful hereditary dictatorship, the only legitimate form of government is one established by the consent of the people and committed to upholding their fundamental human rights to life, liberty, and property. The book justified the Glorious Revolution establishing parliamentary government in England and was an inspiration behind the American Declaration of Independence a century later. Around the world, it continues to have a profound influence on the theory and practice of limited representative government and the protection of basic rights and freedoms under the rule of law.

First Treatise

The *First Treatise* is an extended attack on Sir Robert Filmer's *Patriarcha*. Locke's argument proceeds along two lines: first, he undercuts the Scriptural support that Filmer had offered for his thesis, and second he argues that the acceptance of Filmer's thesis can lead only to absurdity. Locke chose Filmer as his target, he says, because of his reputation and because he "carried this Argument [*jure divino*] farthest, and is supposed to have brought it to perfection" (1st Tr., §5).

Filmer's text presented an argument for a divinely-ordained, hereditary, absolute monarchy. According to Filmer, the Biblical Adam in his role as father possessed unlimited power over his children and this authority passed down through the generations. Locke attacks this on several grounds. Accepting that fatherhood grants authority, he argues, it would do so only by the act of begetting, and so cannot be transmitted to one's children because only God can create life. Nor is the power of a father over his children absolute, as Filmer would have it; Locke points to the joint power parents share over their children outlined in the Bible. In the *Second Treatise*

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Locke returns to a discussion of parental power. (Both of these discussions have drawn the interest of modern feminists such as Carole Pateman.)

Filmer also suggested that Adam's absolute authority came from his ownership over all the world. To this, Locke rebuts that the world was originally held in common (a theme that will return in the *Second Treatise*). But, even if it were not, he argues, God's grant to Adam covered only the land and brute animals, not human beings. Nor could Adam, or his heir, leverage this grant to enslave mankind, for the law of nature forbids reducing one's fellows to a state of desperation, if one possesses a sufficient surplus to maintain oneself securely. And even if this charity were not commanded by reason, Locke continues, such a strategy for gaining dominion would prove only that the foundation of government lies in consent.

Locke intimates in the *First Treatise* that the doctrine of divine right of kings (*jure divino*) will eventually be the downfall of all governments. In his final chapter Locke asks, "Who heir?" If Filmer is correct, there should be only one rightful king in all the world—the heir of Adam. But since it is impossible to discover the true heir of Adam, no government, under Filmer's principles, can require that its members obey its rulers. Filmer must therefore say that men are duty-bound to obey their present rulers. Locke writes:

I think he is the first Politician, who, pretending to settle Government upon its true Basis, and to establish the Thrones of lawful Princes, ever told the World, That he was *properly a King, whose Manner of Government was by Supreme Power, by what Means soever he obtained it*; which in plain *English* is to say, that Regal and Supreme Power is properly and truly his, who can by any Means seize upon it; and if this be, to be *properly a King*, I wonder how he came to think of, or where he will find, an *Usurper*. (1st Tr., §79)

Locke ends the *First Treatise* by examining the history told in the Bible and the history of the world since then; he concludes that there is no evidence to support Filmer's hypothesis. According to Locke, no king has ever claimed that his authority rested upon his being the heir of Adam. It is Filmer, Locke alleges, that is the innovator in politics, not those who assert the natural equality and freedom of man.

Second Treatise

The Second Treatise is notable for a number of themes which Locke develops therein. It begins with a depiction of the state of nature, wherein individuals are under no obligation to obey one another but are each themselves judge of what the law of nature requires. It also covers conquest and slavery, property, representative government, and the right of revolution.

State of nature

Locke defines the state of nature thus:

"To properly understand political power and trace its origins, we must consider the state that all people are in naturally. That is a state of perfect freedom of acting and disposing of their own possessions and persons as they think fit within the bounds of the law of nature. People in this state do not have to ask permission to act or depend on the will of others to arrange matters on their behalf. The natural state is also one of equality in which all power and jurisdiction is reciprocal and no one has more than another. It is evident that all human beings – as creatures belonging to the same species and rank and born indiscriminately with all the same natural advantages and faculties – are equal amongst themselves. They have no relationship of subordination or subjection unless God (the lord and master of them all) had clearly set one person above another and conferred on him an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty."^[11]

The work of Thomas Hobbes made theories based upon a state of nature popular in seventeenth-century England, even as most of those who employed such arguments were deeply troubled by his absolutist conclusions. Locke's state of nature can be seen in light of this tradition. Because there is no divinely ordained monarch over all the world, as was argued in the *First Treatise*, the natural state of mankind is anarchic. In contrast to Hobbes, who posited the state of nature as a hypothetical possibility, Locke took great pains to show that such a state did indeed exist. Indeed, it exists wherever there is no legitimate government. Whereas Hobbes speaks of the misery of the State of Nature more directly, Locke waits until Chapter IX to describe the state of nature as one that 'however free, is full of continual dangers.'

While no individual in this state may tell another what to do or authoritatively pronounce justice in a given case, men are not free to do whatever they please. "The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it" (2nd Tr., §6). The specifics of this law are unwritten, however, and so each is likely to misapply it in his own case. Lacking any commonly recognized, impartial judge, there is no way to correct these misapplications. Even were such a judge available, the just are vastly outnumbered by the unjust and indifferent, so his pronouncements would lack effect. This section, §6, also presumes theism. In other words, rather than arguing for the presence of men by natural ideas, Locke assumes that all men are born by God.

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The law of nature is therefore ill enforced in the state of nature.

If man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; if he be absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to no body, why will he part with his freedom? Why will he give up this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and control of any other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that though in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasion of others: for all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very insecure. This makes him willing to quit a condition, which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers: and it is not without reason, that he seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others, who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name, property. (2nd Tr., §123)

What should be a state of peace very quickly begins to look like the state of war that Hobbes described (though the ill enforcement of the law of nature does not release individuals from their obligation to it, as it does in Hobbes).

It is to avoid the state of war that often occurs in the state of nature and to protect their private property that men enter into civil or political society, i.e. state of society. It is also the state to which men return upon the dissolution of government, i.e., under tyranny.

Conquest and slavery

Ch. 4 ("Of Slavery") and Ch. 16 ("Of Conquest") are sources of some confusion: the former provides a justification for slavery, the latter, the rights of conquerors. Because the *Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina* provided that a master had perfect authority over his slaves, some have taken these chapters to be an apology for the institution of slavery in Colonial America.

Most Locke scholars roundly reject this reading, as it is directly at odds with the text. The extent of Locke's involvement in drafting the *Fundamental Constitutions* is a matter of some debate, but even attributing full culpability for its contents and for his having profited from the Atlantic slave trade, the majority of experts will concede that Locke may have been a hypocrite in this matter, but are adamant that no part of the *Two Treatises* can be used to provide theoretical support for slavery by bare right of conquest.

In the rhetoric of seventeenth-century England, those who opposed the increasing power of the kings claimed that the country was headed for a condition of slavery. Locke therefore asks, facetiously, under what conditions such slavery might be justified. He notes that slavery cannot come about as a matter of contract (which will be the basis of Locke's political system). To be a slave is to be subject to the absolute, arbitrary power of another; as men do not have this power even over themselves, they cannot sell or otherwise grant it to another. One that is deserving of death, i.e., who has violated the law of nature, may be enslaved. This is, however, "but the state of war continued" (2nd Tr., §24), and even one justly a slave therefore has no obligation to obedience.

In providing a justification for slavery, he has rendered all forms of slavery as it actually exists invalid. Moreover, as one may not submit to slavery, there is a moral injunction to attempt to throw off and escape it whenever it looms. Most scholars take this to be Locke's point regarding slavery: submission to absolute monarchy is a violation of the law of nature, for one does not have the right to enslave oneself.

The legitimacy of an English king depended on (somehow) demonstrating descent from William the Conqueror: the right of conquest was therefore a topic rife with constitutional connotations. Locke does not say that all subsequent English monarchs have been illegitimate, but he does make their rightful authority dependent solely upon their having acquired the people's approbation.

Locke first argues that, clearly, aggressors in an unjust war can claim no right of conquest: everything they despoil may be retaken as soon as the dispossessed have the strength to do so. Their children retain this right, so an ancient usurpation does not become lawful with time. The rest of the chapter then considers what rights a just conqueror might have.

The argument proceeds negatively: Locke proposes one power a conqueror could gain, and then demonstrates how in point of fact that power cannot be claimed. He gains no authority over those that conquered with him, for they did not wage war unjustly: thus, whatever other right William may have had in England, he could not claim kingship over his fellow Normans by right of conquest. The subdued are under the conqueror's despotical authority, but only those who actually took part in the fighting. Those who were governed by the defeated aggressor do not become subject to the authority of the victorious aggressor. They lacked the power to do an unjust thing, and so could not have granted that power to their governors: the aggressor therefore was not acting as their representative, and they cannot be punished for his actions. And while the conqueror may seize the person of the vanquished aggressor in an unjust war, he cannot seize the latter's property: he may not drive the innocent wife and children of a villain into poverty for another's unjust acts. While the property is technically that of the defeated, his innocent dependents have a claim to it to which the just conqueror must yield. He cannot seize more than the vanquished could forfeit, and the latter had no right to ruin his dependents. (He

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may, however, demand and take reparations for the damages suffered in the war, so long as these leave enough in the possession of the aggressor's dependants for their survival).

In so arguing, Locke accomplishes two objectives. First, he neutralizes the claims of those who see all authority flowing from William I by the latter's right of conquest. In the absence of any other claims to authority (e.g., Filmer's primogeniture from Adam, divine anointment, etc.), all kings would have to found their authority on the consent of the governed. Second, he removes much of the incentive for conquest in the first place, for even in a just war the spoils are limited to the persons of the defeated and reparations sufficient only to cover the costs of the war, and even then only when the aggressor's territory can easily sustain such costs (i.e., it can never be a profitable endeavor). Needless to say, the bare claim that one's spoils are the just compensation for a just war does not suffice to make it so, in Locke's view.

Property

In the *Second Treatise*, Locke claims that civil society was created for the protection of property. In saying this, he relies on the etymological root of "property," Latin *proprius*, or that which is one's own, including oneself (cf. French *propre*). Thus, by "property" he means "life, liberty, and estate." By saying that political society was established for the better protection of property, he claims that it serves the private (and non-political) interests of its constituent members: it does not promote some good which can be realized only in community with others (e.g., virtue).

For this account to work, individuals must possess some property outside of society, i.e., in the state of nature: the state cannot be the sole origin of property, declaring what belongs to whom. If the purpose of government is the protection of property, the latter must exist independently of the former. Filmer had said that, if there even were a state of nature (which he denied), everything would be held in common: there could be no private property, and hence no justice or injustice (injustice being understood as treating someone else's goods, liberty, or life as if it were one's own). Thomas Hobbes had argued the same thing. Locke therefore provides an account of how material property could arise in the absence of government.

He begins by asserting that each individual, at a minimum, "owns" himself; this is a corollary of each individual's being free and equal in the state of nature. As a result, each must also own his own labor: to deny him his labor would be to make him a slave. One can therefore take items from the common store of goods by mixing one's labor with them: an apple on the tree is of no use to anyone — it must be picked to be eaten — and the picking of that apple makes it one's own. In an alternate argument, Locke claims that we must allow it to become private property lest all mankind have starved, despite the bounty of the world. A man must be allowed to eat, and thus have what he has eaten be his own (such that he could deny others a right to use it). The apple is surely his when he swallows it, when he chews it, when he bites into it, when he brings it to his mouth, etc.: it became his as soon as he mixed his labor with it (by picking it from the tree).

This does not yet say *why* an individual is allowed to take from the common store of nature. There is a necessity to do so in order to eat, but this does not yet establish why others must respect one's property, especially as they labor under the like necessity. Locke assures his readers that the state of nature is a state of plenty: one may take from communal store if one leaves a) enough and b) as good for others, and since nature is bountiful, one can take all that one can use without taking anything *from* someone else. Moreover, one can take only so much as one can use before it spoils. There are then two provisos regarding what one can take, the "enough and as good" condition and "spoilage."

Gold does not rot. Neither does silver, or any other precious metal or gem. They are, moreover, useless, their aesthetic value not entering into the equation. One can heap up as much of them as one wishes, or take them in trade for food. By the tacit consent of mankind, they become a form of money (one accepts gold in exchange for apples with the understanding that someone else will accept that gold in exchange for wheat). One can therefore avoid the spoilage limitation by selling all that one has amassed before it rots; the limits on acquisition thus disappear.

In this way, Locke argues that a full economic system could, in principle, exist within the state of nature. Property could therefore predate the existence of government, and thus society can be dedicated to the protection of property.

In the Twentieth Century, Marxist scholars viewed Locke as the founder of bourgeois capitalism. Those who were opposed to communism accepted this reading of Locke, and celebrated him for it. He has therefore become associated with capitalism.^[citation needed]

Representative government

It is a misconception that Locke and his social contract demanded a democracy. Rather, Locke felt that a legitimate contract could exist between citizens and monarchies or oligarchies. His ideas heavily influenced, however, both the American and French

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Revolutions. His notions of people's rights and the role of civil government provided strong support for the intellectual movements of both revolutions.

Right of revolution

Locke believed that the relationship between the state and its citizens took the form of a 'contract,' whereby the governed agreed to surrender certain freedoms they enjoyed under the state of nature in exchange for the order and protection provided by a state, exercised according to the rule of law. However, if the state oversteps its limits and begins to exercise arbitrary power, it forfeits its 'side' of the contract and thus, the contract becomes void; the citizens not only have the right to overthrow the state, but are indeed morally compelled to revolt and replace it. Locke believes that the citizens are compelled to revolt because absolute power is never a remedy for the state of nature; however, Locke makes great effort to point out that if the citizens are going to revolt they must be on the right side of the issue. A secondary view on Locke's position of revolution argues that Locke requires that the legislative power must be dissolved, not by the actions of the common people, which effectively puts people back into the state of nature. This view would not suggest that people have the right to revolt, but rather to resist an arbitrary power to dissolve itself in order to make way for a new political structure.

D. Thomas Hobbes *Leviathan* Reading Questions:

1. What is the purpose of political authority according to Thomas Hobbes?
2. How does Hobbes' theories of government differ from Locke and Rousseau?
3. What is Hobbes point of view regarding a social contract?

Thomas Hobbes

Social contract describes a broad class of theories that try to explain the ways in which people form states to maintain social order. The notion of the social contract implies that the people give up sovereignty to a government or other authority in order to receive or maintain social order through the rule of law. It can also be thought of as an agreement by the governed on a set of rules by which they are governed.

Overview

According to Thomas Hobbes, human life would be "nasty, brutish, and short" without political authority. In its absence, we would live in a state of nature, where we each have unlimited natural freedoms, including the "right to all things" and thus the freedom to harm all who threaten our own self-preservation; there would be an endless "war of all against all" (*Bellum omnium contra omnes*). To avoid this, free men establish political community i.e. civil society through a social contract in which each gain civil rights in return for subjecting himself to civil law or to political authority.

Alternatively, some have argued that we gain civil rights in return for accepting the obligation to respect and defend the rights of others, giving up some freedoms to do so; this alternative formulation of the duty arising from the social contract is often identified with arguments about military service.

Violations of the contract

The social contract and the civil rights it gives us are neither "natural rights" nor permanently fixed. Rather, the contract itself is the means towards an end — the benefit of all — and (according to some philosophers such as Locke or Rousseau), is only legitimate to the extent that it meets the general interest ("general will" in Rousseau). Therefore, when failings are found in the contract, we renegotiate to change the terms, using methods such as elections and legislature. Locke theorized the right of rebellion in case of the contract leading to tyranny.

Since civil rights come from agreeing to the contract, those who choose to violate their contractual obligations, such as by committing crimes, abdicate their rights, and the rest of society can be expected to protect itself against the actions of such outlaws. To be a member of society is to accept responsibility for following its rules, along with the threat of punishment for violating them. In this way, society works by "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon" (Hardin 1968).

Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* (1651)

The first modern philosopher to articulate a detailed contract theory was Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679). According to Hobbes, the lives of individuals in the state of nature were "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short", a state where self-interest and the absence of

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rights and contracts prevented the 'social', or society. Life was 'anarchic' (without leadership/ the concept of sovereignty). Individuals in the state of nature were apolitical and asocial. This state of nature is followed by the social contract.

The social contract was an 'occurrence' during which individuals came together and ceded some of their individual rights so that others would cede theirs (e.g. person A gives up his/her right to kill person B if person B does the same). This resulted in the establishment of society, and by extension, the state, a sovereign entity (like the individuals, now under its rule, used to be) which was to protect these new rights which were now to regulate societal interactions. Society was thus no longer anarchic.

But the state system, which grew out of the social contract, was anarchic (without leadership). Just as the individuals in the state of nature had been sovereigns and thus guided by self-interest and the absence of rights, so states now acted in their self-interest in competition with each other. Just like the state of nature, states were thus bound to be in conflict because there was no sovereign over and above the state (i.e. more powerful) capable of imposing social-contract laws. Indeed, Hobbes' work helped to serve as a basis for the realism theories of international relations, advanced by E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau.

John Locke's *Second Treatise of Government* (1689)

John Locke's conception of the social contract differed from Hobbes' in several ways, but retained the central notion that persons in a state of nature would willingly come together to form a state. Locke believed that individuals in a state of nature would have stronger moral limits on their action than accepted by Hobbes, but recognized that people would still live in fear of one another. Locke argued that individuals would agree to form a state that would provide a "neutral judge", and that could therefore protect the lives, liberty, and property of those who lived within it. While Hobbes argued for near-absolute authority, Locke argued that laws could only be legitimate if they sought to achieve the common good. Locke also believed that people will do the right thing as a group, and that all people have natural rights.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Du contrat social* (1762)

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), in his influential 1762 treatise *The Social Contract*, outlined a different version of social contract theory, based on popular sovereignty. Although Rousseau wrote that the British were perhaps at the time the freest people on earth, he did not approve of their representative government. Rousseau believed that liberty was possible only where there was direct rule by the people as a whole in lawmaking, where popular sovereignty was indivisible and inalienable. Citizens must, in at least some circumstances, be able to choose together the fundamental rules by which they would live, and be able to revise those rules on later occasions if they choose to do so - something the British people as a whole were unable to do.

Rousseau's political theory has some points in common with Locke's individualism, but departs from it in his development of the "luminous conception" (which he credited to Diderot) of the general will. Rousseau argues a citizen can be an egoist and decide that his personal interest should override the collective interest. However, as part of a collective body, the individual citizen puts aside his egoism to create a "general will", which is popular sovereignty itself. Popular sovereignty (i.e., the rule of law), thus decides what is good for society as a whole, and the individual (including the administrative head of state, who could be a monarch) must bow to it, or be forced to bow to it:

[The social contract] can be reduced to the following terms: *Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will; and in a body we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.*^[2]

Rousseau's striking phrase that man must "be forced to be free"^[3] should be understood this way: since the indivisible and inalienable popular sovereignty decides what is good for the whole, then if an individual lapses back into his ordinary egoism and breaks the law, he will be forced to listen to what they decided as a member of the collectivity (i.e. as citizens). Thus, the law, inasmuch as it is voted by the people's representatives, is not a limitation of individual freedom, but its expression; and enforcement of law, including criminal law, is not a restriction on individual liberty, as the individual, as a citizen, explicitly agreed to be constrained if, as a private individual, he did not respect his own will as formulated in the general will. Because laws represent the restraints of civil freedom, they represent the leap made from humans in the state of nature into civil society. In this sense, the law is a civilizing force, and therefore Rousseau believed that the laws that govern a people helped to mold their character.

E. Niccolò Machiavelli *The Prince* Reading Questions:

1. Identify and define the different types of principalities according to Machiavelli.
2. In what cases would Machiavelli advocate evil to acquire a principality. Give an example.
3. Is Machiavelli against using mercenaries? Why or why not?
4. Is it better for a ruler to have good qualities or evil qualities?
5. How can a leader keep from being hated, but still feared?

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6. What are ways that a leader can obtain a favorable reputation?

Summary of The Prince

The Prince is unique, not because it explains how to take control of other lands and how to control them, but because it gives advice that often disregards all moral and ethical rules. About this Machiavelli states that:

*"Because how one ought to live is so far removed from how one lives that he who lets go of what is done for that which one ought to do sooner learns ruin than his own preservation: because a man who might want to make a show of goodness in all things necessarily comes to ruin among so many who are not good. Because of this it is necessary for a prince, wanting to maintain himself, to learn how to be able to be not good and to use this and not use it according to necessity."*¹

The above advice is not the common advice given to mayors, senators, presidents, and others in public office. Still, we know that the above advice is practical and will best get the official more power or give the republic less problems.

The Prince is different from other books about creating and controlling principalities because it doesn't tell you what an ideal prince or principality is, but Machiavelli explains through examples, which princes are the most successful in obtaining and maintaining power. Machiavelli draws his examples from personal observations made while he was on diplomatic missions for Florence and from his readings in ancient history. His writing has the mark of the Renaissance upon it because he sprinkles his text with Latin phrases and many examples are drawn from Classical sources.

Machiavelli starts the book off explaining the different kinds of states, republics and principalities. He then goes on to explain the types of principalities, hereditary, mixed, and what he calls "new". New principalities are principalities that have just been created and their leaders are not hereditary. Mixed principalities are like those of the Pope or the sultan, he explains, for they have been established for a long time (like a hereditary principality), but the leadership does not pass from father to son (like a new principality).

Next, Machiavelli explains how to rule the different principalities and what challenges are presented to the ruler in each case. He says that hereditary leaders have an easier time than new princes because the people are already accustomed to their hereditary leaders and accept their power, but a new prince has to work hard to be accepted by his people.

Machiavelli then goes into detail about how to acquire more land for your principality, about this he says:

*"To desire to acquire is truly something very natural and ordinary and always, when men do it who can, they will be lauded, or not blamed; but when they cannot, and want to do it anyway, here is the error and the blame."*²

There are four ways that he discusses to acquire more land: 1) your own arms and virtue, 2) fortune, 3) others' arms, and 4) inequity. The first is the best way in his opinion because land acquired that way is the easiest to hang on to after you have conquered it, because you will still have your loyal militia, not mercenaries, and your own virtues to rule the principality wisely. To Machiavelli, the word virtues does not have the same meaning as it does to us, to him it means manliness and strength.

Principalities that are acquired by fortune, either for money or as a gift, are one of the hardest to hang onto, because, as we see here, the new prince is not necessarily stable enough to rule:

*"Such princes stand simply upon the will and fortune of whoever conceded it to them, which are two most voluble and unstable things: and they do not know how and they have not the power to hold that rank: they do not know, because, if he is not a man of great genius and virtue, it is not reasonable that, having always lived in private fortune, he knows how to command; they cannot, because they do not have forces that might be friendly and faithful to them. Moreover, the states that come right away, like all other things of nature that are born and grow fast, cannot have their roots and connections, so that the first adverse circumstances extinguish them..."*³

Machiavelli also advocates the use of evil to acquire a principality. He gives the example of Agathocles of Syracuse as proof that this works and will enable you to rule the land peaceably through fear:

*"Born of a potter, this one always had an iniquitous life throughout his years: nonetheless, he accomplished his iniquities with such virtue of spirit and of body that, having joined the militia, he rose through its ranks to become praetor of Syracuse. Being established in rank, and having decided to become prince and to keep with violence and without obligation to others what had been conceded him by agreement... one morning he convened the people and the senate of Syracuse, as if he had had to deliberate things pertinent to the republic; and at a preordained nod he had all the senators and richest of the people killed by his soldiers. Once they were killed he occupied and held the principality of that city without any civil controversy."*⁴

Machiavelli then continues on to write about determining the strengths and weaknesses of other principalities and the ecclesiastical principalities of the Pope and church. He then discusses one of his main points of the book: mercenaries, to be used?, or not to be used? The topic of mercenaries being used in place of your own troops or not is often mentioned by him. A native militia was an ideal that he achieved while Florence was being ruled by Piero Soderini. Here we find out why Machiavelli is against the use of mercenaries:

*"...if one holds his state on the basis of mercenary arms, he will never be firm or secure; because they are disunited, ambitious, without discipline, unfaithful; gallant among friends, vile among enemies; no fear of God, no faith with men; and one defers ruin insofar as one defers the attack; and in peace you are despoiled by them, in war by the enemy."*⁵

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He then goes on to support this statement with examples of Roman and contemporary generals who did or did not use mercenaries in place of their own countrymen and what became of them. One of the most leaders often held up as an example to be followed is Cesare Borgia, who, though often quite brutal, Machiavelli states brought peace and order to the lands he conquered, and so his actions should be followed.

"I will never fear to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. The duke entered Romagna with auxiliary arms, leading wholly French troops, and with these he took Imola and Forlì. But, such arms not seeming secure to him, he turned to the mercenary ones, judging that there be less danger in them, and engaged both the Orsini and the Vitelli. Later, managing and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and dangerous, he extinguished them and turned to his own. And one can easily see the difference between these arms, considering the difference between the duke's reputation, when he had only the French and when he had Orsini and Vitelli, and when he was left with his own soldiers and on his own: and always one will find it increased; never was he so esteemed as when everyone saw that he was the total owner of his arms."⁶

Machiavelli also cites a Biblical reference to David and Saul about the problems of using someone else's armor:

"When David offered himself to Saul to go fight with the Philistine challenger Goliath, Saul, to give him spirit, armed with his arms: which David, as soon as he put them on, refused, saying that with he could not make use of himself well, and therefore that he wanted to meet the enemy with his sling and his knife. In the end the arms of others either fall off you, or weigh you down or squeeze you."⁷

The next topic Machiavelli discusses is what qualities apply to a prince so that he can maintain the best control. He discusses military knowledge, liberality and parsimony, to be loved or to be feared, trustworthiness, good and bad reputations. Military knowledge is one of the most important qualities a prince can have for:

"...among the causes of evil which being unarmed brings you, it makes you contemptible, which is one of those infamies against which the prince must guard himself..."⁸

and *"...a prince must not have any objective nor any thought, nor take up any art, other than the art of war and its ordering and discipline; because it is the only art that pertains to him who commands. And it is of such virtue that not only does it maintain those who were born princes, but many times makes men rise to that rank from private station; and conversely one sees that when princes have thought more of delicacies than of arms, they have lost their state."⁹*

The conclusion Machiavelli draws as to whether it is better to have good qualities or evil qualities, is normally considered unethical or immoral for most often he supports the evil over the good, for the sake of political power. About evil qualities being better to have and more natural he states:

"Et etiam let him not care about incurring infamy for those vices without which he might hardly save the state; because, if one considers everything well, one will find that something that appears a virtue, if followed, would be his ruin, and that some other thing that appears a vice, if followed, results in his security and well-being."¹⁰

Machiavelli next deals with how to handle money in his chapter titled *Of liberality and parsimony*. He states that it is best to be parsimonious because you should spend your money on the country's defense and because eventually you will run out of money. To continue being generous you will have to tax your people heavily to gain more money, defeating the purpose of being generous. In Machiavelli's view, the purpose is to increase the populations love for you, which he later discusses. He then goes on to explain the reasons behind his thinking:

"...I say that it would be well to be considered liberal: nonetheless, liberality, used so that you may be so considered, hurts you; because, if it is used virtuously and as it should be used, it would not be known and you will not shed the infamy of its opposite. And consequently, if you want to maintain the name of liberal among men, it is necessary not to spare any sumptuousness; so that, always, a prince who does this will consume all of his resources in such works; and in the end, if he wants to retain the name of liberal, he will be required to weigh down the people extraordinarily and to be taxy and to do all the things that can be done to have money."¹¹

Machiavelli also writes about whether it is better to be loved or feared, coming up with the conclusion that is best to be both, but since usually one can only have one of those qualities, it is best to be feared, but not hated. This conclusion seems very unethical, but Machiavelli defends it, saying:

"...a prince must not care about the infamy of cruelty in order to keep his subjects united and faithful; because with very few examples he will be more merciful than those who, because of too much mercy, allow disorders to go on, from which spring killings or depredations: because these normally offend a whole collectivity, while those executions which come from the prince offend an individual."¹²

Machiavelli then backs this up with an example from Cesare Borgia:

"Cesare Borgia was considered cruel; nonetheless, that cruelty of his had fixed up Romagna, united it, reduced it to peace and reliability. Which, if were to be well considered, would be seen to have been much more merciful than the Florentine people, which, in order to escape the name of cruel, let Pistoia be destroyed."¹³

Another common ethical law that Machiavelli feels princes do not need to abide by is that people should be trustworthy. At the beginning of Chapter 18, we find his reasons for this opinion:

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"How laudable it is for a prince to keep faith, and to live with integrity and not guile, everyone perceives: nonetheless, in our times one sees by experience that the princes who have done great things are the ones who have taken little account of faith, and who have known to turn men's brains with guile: and in the end have surpassed those who grounded themselves on loyalty."¹⁴

Machiavelli next deals with how to keep from being hated by your people. To keep from being hated (but feared) he recommends the following things to a prince:

"...he keeps himself from his citizens' and his subjects' possessions, and from their women: and even when he might have need to proceed against someone's blood, he should do it when there might be convenient justification and manifest cause; but, above all, [he should] abstain from other people's things; because men sooner forget the death of the father than they do the loss of patrimony."¹⁵

and

"It makes one contemptible to be held variable, light, effeminate, pusillanimous, irresolute: which a prince must avoid as he would a shoal, and to scheme so that greatness, spiritedness, gravity, strength might be recognized from his actions, and to insist that his word be irrevocable concerning the private dealings of the subjects; and that he maintain himself in such repute that no one might think either of deceiving him or of getting around him."¹⁶

In this section, Machiavelli also mentions:

"...that hatred is acquired through good works as well as by nasty ones..."

He also mentions which class of people it is best to be kind to and to listen to the needs and wants of: the peasants, the aristocracy, or the soldiers. He states that the people are the best to listen to because they will offer you the best protection in times of war and will best keep you in power if you do what they need and want. He does mention that this varies and sometimes, as in the case of the Roman leaders, one needs to listen to the army:

"...as were the armies of the Roman empire. And so, if at that time it was necessary to satisfy the soldiers more than the peoples, it was because soldiers could do more than the peoples; now it is necessary to all princes, except for the Turk and the sultan, to satisfy the people rather than the soldiers, because the former people can do more than the latter."

Machiavelli goes so far to say that a prince does not need fortresses if your people really love you and would give you safe refuge in times of war. He then shows this in an example of a countess whose people did not give her refuge:

"In our times, one does not see that they [fortresses] have profited any prince, if not the countess of Forlì, when count Girolamo, her consort, was killed; because by means of it she was able to flee the people's attack and wait for help from Milan, and take back the state. And the circumstances then were such that the foreigner could not help the people; but later, when Cesare Borgia attacked, the fortresses were worth little to her, and her hostile people joined with the foreigner. Therefore, then and before, it would have been more secure for her not to be hated by the people than to have had a fortress"

The reputation of a prince and the methods of gaining a good reputation, are the next subjects of *The Prince*. Some ways Machiavelli lists to obtain a favorable reputation are:

"...above all a prince must scheme to give himself the fame of a great man and of excellent judgment in every action. A prince is also esteemed when he is a true friend and a true enemy, that is to say, when he comes out in favor of one against another without hesitation."

Machiavelli also stresses the importance of having good secretaries and ministers for you can tell the intelligence of a prince by the friends and secretaries he has. To find good ministers he says:

"But how a prince may recognize the minister, there is a mode which never fails. When you see the minister think more of himself than of you, and that he seeks what is useful to him in all actions, someone made that way will never be a good minister, never will you be able to trust him: because whoever has another's state in his hand must never think of himself but always of the prince..."

Machiavelli also recommends to princes to keep away from flatters because you shall never know when they (or anyone else) is telling the truth and you will lose a good source of information. Instead, you should not listen to just *anyone*, but only to the very few that you can be sure of.

The Prince is concluded with a call by Machiavelli for Italy to be united under one prince, as that is how God wants it to be, he claims. He asks for the help of the Medici family in this task, though we know he did not succeed. It would be another 354 years before Italy would be finally united under Garibaldi.

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