

Delaware Model Unit

This unit has been created as an exemplary model for teachers in (re)design of course curricula. An exemplary model unit has undergone a rigorous peer review and jurying process to ensure alignment to selected Delaware Content Standards.

Unit Title: **Historians in Conflict: The Causes of the First World War**

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Content Area: **Social Studies – World History**
Grade Levels: **9-12**

Summary of Unit

This unit uses the outbreak of the First World War as a case study to uncover reasons for different interpretations of the same event. Students will analyze primary and secondary source materials to construct their own interpretations of what happened in the weeks, months, and years leading up to August 1914, and then critique interpretations advanced by others.

At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, the victorious allies clearly stated their conclusions about who was to blame for starting the world war: Germany and her allies. Germany's culpability, articulated in the "Guilt Clause" in the Treaty of Versailles, allowed the allies to dismantle the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires and demand reparation payments from them. This unit asks students to re-examine the assumptions made in the Treaty—did Germany start the war? Does the historical evidence support this conclusion? The treaty's assumptions about war guilt sparked a controversy that has continued to this day. The causes of the First World War remain one of the most popular topics for historical investigation. Historian Margaret MacMillan estimates that there are over 21,000 books, in English, about the origins of the war. By the end of this unit, students should appreciate that interpretations of the past have important consequences for the present and future.

Unit Overview

Lesson One: Students examine the **long-term trends** that contributed to the outbreak of war: the *Alliance System*, *Imperialism*, *Militarism*, and *Nationalism*. Students use primary source documents to create a presentation on one of these trends.

Lesson Two: Students investigate the **short-term events** that may have led to war. Students decide which events were most significant and create their own timeline of the outbreak of the First World War.

Lesson Three: Now that students have studied the causes of the First World War, they are ready to evaluate the interpretations of historians. Students analyze the arguments of a historian and compare the historian's conclusions to the Guilt Clause in the Treaty of Versailles.

Stage 1 – Desired Results

(What students will know, do, and understand)

Delaware Content Standards

- **History Standard Three 9-12a:** Students will compare competing historical narratives by contrasting different historians' choice of questions, use and choice of sources, perspectives, beliefs, and points of view in order to demonstrate how these factors contribute to different interpretations.
- **History Standard One 9-12a:** Students will analyze historical materials to trace the development of an idea or trend across space or over a prolonged period of time in order to explain patterns of historical continuity and change.

Big Ideas

- Historical Investigation
- Historical Interpretation
- Chronology

Unit Enduring Understandings

- What a historian writes depends upon that historian's personal background and methods, the questions asked about the sources, and the sources used to find the answers to those questions.
- History is often messy, yet a historian must logically organize events, recognize patterns and trends, explain cause and effect, make inferences, and draw conclusions from those sources that are available at the time.

Unit Essential Questions

- How do historians' choice of questions, selection and use of sources, and personal biases affect their interpretations of the past?
- How can we use historical sources to analyze continuity and change over time?

Knowledge and Skills

Students will know...

- The long- and short-term causes of the First World War.
- The terms of the Treaty of Versailles.

Students will be able to...

- Identify differences among historical interpretations.
- Explain why historians have come to different conclusions about the same event.
- Use historical documents to create their own chronologies and draw their own conclusions.

Stage 2 – Assessment Evidence
(Evidence that will be collected to determine whether or not Desired Results are achieved)

Transfer Task

Was It Genocide?

Prior Knowledge	Now that you understand why historians disagree about interpretations of the past and how those interpretations can affect the present, you are ready to analyze a current controversy over a historical event.
Problem	Six members of the U.S. House of Representatives have proposed House Resolution 106, "Affirmation of the United States Record on the Armenian Genocide Resolution." The resolution accuses the Turkish people of the deliberate murder of 1.5 million Armenians in the Ottoman Empire in the years 1915–1923. The resolution calls this action <i>genocide</i> .
Role/ Perspective	You are an adviser to Mr. Smith, a member of the U.S. House of Representatives. Mr. Smith is active in foreign policy and is a supporter of U.S. military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Mr. Smith represents a district with a substantial Armenian-American population. Mr. Smith needs your advice on how to vote on Resolution 106.
Product/ Performance	You are to prepare a report for Mr. Smith that tells him what he needs to know in order to vote on Resolution 106. Your report should include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Analysis of the Armenian argument and evidence. ▪ Analysis of the Turkish argument and evidence. ▪ Prediction of how a yes or no vote will affect the current political situation. ▪ Reasons why Mr. Smith should vote YES or NO.

Recommended Sources

- House Resolution 106 – <http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c110:H.RES.106>
- BBC News: Q & A Armenian Genocide Dispute – <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6045182.stm>
- "White House and Turkey Fight Bill on Armenia" – <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/09/AR2007100902347.html>
- Turkish Historical Society: Refutation of Armenian Resolution – <http://www.ttk.org.tr/index.php?Page=Sayfa&No=186>
- Armenian National Institute: Genocide FAQ – <http://www.armenian-genocide.org/genocidfaq.html>
- Archival Documents on the Armenian Genocide – <http://www.armenian-genocide.org/sampledocs.html>
- "Turkey's Armenian Dilemma" – <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6386625.stm>

Rubric

Scoring Category	Score Point 3	Score Point 2	Score Point 1
Critique of the Armenian position that includes an examination of questions, sources, and biases	Provides a persuasive critique of the Armenian position that includes an examination of questions, sources, and biases	Provides a somewhat persuasive critique of the Armenian position that includes an examination of questions, sources, and biases	Provides a minimally persuasive critique of the Armenian position that includes an examination of questions, sources, and biases
Critique of the Turkish position that includes an examination of questions, sources, and biases	Provides a persuasive critique of the Turkish position that includes an examination of questions, sources, and biases	Provides a somewhat persuasive critique of the Turkish position that includes an examination of questions, sources, and biases	Provides a minimally persuasive critique of the Turkish position that includes an examination of questions, sources, and biases
Prediction of how the vote will affect current political situation	Provides a well-developed explanation of how a <i>yes</i> AND <i>no</i> vote might affect the current political situation	Provides a partially developed explanation of how a <i>yes</i> AND <i>no</i> vote might affect the current political situation	Provides a minimally developed explanation of how a <i>yes</i> AND <i>no</i> vote might affect the current political situation
Reasons why the Representative should vote yes or no	Provides well-developed reasoning for why the representative should vote <i>yes</i> or <i>no</i>	Provides partially developed reasoning for why the representative should vote <i>yes</i> or <i>no</i>	Provides minimally developed reasoning for why the representative should vote <i>yes</i> or <i>no</i>

Student Self-Assessment and Reflection

When students are required to think about their own learning, to articulate what they understand and what they still need to learn, achievement improves.

-Black and William, 1998; Sternberg, 1996; Young, 2000

How a teacher uses the information from assessments determines whether that assessment is formative or summative. Formative assessments should be used to direct learning and instruction and are not intended to be graded.

The Checks for Understanding at the end of each instructional strategy should be used as formative assessment and may be used as writing prompts or as small-group or whole-class discussion. Students should respond to feedback and be given opportunities to improve their work. The rubrics will help teachers frame that feedback.

An interactive notebook or writing log could be used to organize student work and exhibit student growth and reflection.

Stage 3 – Learning Plan

(Design learning activities to align with Stage 1 and Stage 2 expectations)

Lesson One: Long-Term Trends

Essential Question

- How can we use historical sources to analyze continuity and change over time?

Instructional Strategies

Gathering Information

Anticipation Guide to World War I

At the beginning of the unit, ask students to complete the “Before Instruction” column of the **Anticipation Guide** ([Appendix 1a](#)). Teachers may ask students to share their answers but should not correct any misconceptions. Teachers should return to the Anticipation Guide at the end of unit and have students complete the “After Instruction” column.¹

Gathering Information

Developing Background Knowledge

Direct Instruction: Trends Leading to Lasting Peace. One danger inherent in studying the causes of the war is to draw the conclusion that the war was inevitable—the war occurred because all of these causes led to it. It is important that students understand that the war was NOT inevitable and that there were concurrent historical trends that seemed to lead to lasting peace. See attached [PowerPoint](#) presentation, *Trends Leading to Peace*.

Gathering Information

The 1919 Peace Treaties

Students will examine excerpts from the 1919 peace treaties to determine a) whom the allies named as guilty parties; and b) the consequences of the treaties for the defeated nations.

- An overview of the Treaties of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, Trianon, Sevres, and Versailles – <http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005425>
- Key Political and Territorial clauses of the Versailles Treaty – <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1919versailles.html>
- Maps of Europe before and after WWI – http://www.schoolshistory.org.uk/ASLevel_History/week4_versailles.htm

¹ Thank you to Fran O’Malley, who shared this strategy at a Historical Literacy workshop in 2010.

Check for Understanding

Article 231: The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.

How did the guilt clause in the Treaty of Versailles affect Germany and her allies? Provide specific historical evidence to support your answer.

Rubric

2 – This response gives a valid effect with accurate and relevant historical evidence.

1 – This response gives a valid effect with inaccurate, irrelevant, or no historical evidence.





Extending and Refining Trends That Led to War

Introduce students to the four general trends that contributed to the outbreak of war.

- Alliances
- Imperialism
- Militarism
- Nationalism

Provide students with definitions for each term. Instruct students to create a visual representation of each word. Teachers may also want to ask students to think of an example of each trend from a period of history they have already studied ([Appendix 1b](#)).

Example

Trend	Definition ²	Visual Representation	Historical Example
Alliances	A formal agreement or treaty between two or more nations to cooperate for specific purposes.		Many Native American groups made alliances with France and fought against the British in the French and Indian War.
Imperialism	The policy of extending the rule or authority of an empire or nation over foreign countries, or of acquiring and holding colonies and dependencies.		The Spanish practiced imperialism when they conquered the New World and created Spanish colonies.
Militarism	The principle or policy of maintaining a large military establishment.		Ancient Sparta was known for its militarism. All children were raised to fight for the city-state.
Nationalism	Devotion and loyalty to one's own nation; patriotism		Napoleon used French nationalism to inspire his troops in the Napoleonic Wars.

For more background information on the causes of the First World War:

- The Causes of World War One – <http://www.firstworldwar.com/origins/causes.htm>
- The Origins of World War One – http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/origins_01.shtml#one
- World War One—Causes – <http://www.historyonthenet.com/WW1/causes.htm>

Application

Document Analysis and Exhibit

For both **Choice A** and **Choice B** below, teachers may print out the document sets and have students work with hard copies. Or, teachers may choose to have students upload the documents into a free, online, interactive poster site, such as Glogster.

<http://edu.glogster.com/>

Teacher Tip: Teachers may want to give students Document Analysis worksheets from the National Archives to help guide their work:

<http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/worksheets/>

Both **Choice A** and **Choice B** use the four document sets located in [Appendix 1c](#).

² Definitions from Dictionary.com. *Dictionary.com Unabridged*. Random House, Inc. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/alliance> (accessed: September 16, 2010).

Choice A

- Give small groups of students a collection of documents that includes examples of all four trends.
- Instruct students to sort the documents into the four categories. (Many documents can fit into more than one category—students must be able to defend their choices).
- Instruct students to select **ONE** document to analyze thoroughly and present to the class as a representation of one of the trends that led to war.

Choice B

- Assign small groups of students one document set. Students analyze the documents.
- Instruct students to use the documents (it is not necessary to use all the documents) to create an exhibit for one trend that led to war. If using hard copies, students may cut and paste the documents onto poster paper, then add captions and their analysis. Or, students may upload the documents into Glogster, arrange the documents, and add their commentary.

Check for Understanding

- ❖ Does one of these trends seem more significant than the others in the outbreak of war? Explain your answer with an example from the documents.

Rubric

2 – This response gives a valid explanation with an accurate and relevant example.

1 – This response gives a valid explanation with an inaccurate, irrelevant, or no example.

Lesson Two: Short-Term Events - Creating a Chronology

Essential Question

- How can we use historical sources to analyze continuity and change over time?

Instructional Strategies

Gathering Information

Graphic Organizer


The assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary is often cited as the cause of the First World War. Ask students if they think it possible for the assassination of one man to lead the world into war.

Read together a newspaper account of the assassination: "Archduke Franz Ferdinand shot dead by student" in the *Manchester Guardian*, June 29, 1914.

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/08/first-world-war-franz-ferdinand-sarajevo>

Have students complete a reading graphic organizer with the article.

Example:



Extending and Refining Jigsaw

Students will investigate specific events that may have led to war using a jigsaw activity. Assign individual students or student pairs to one of the events listed below. Students use the **Events That Led to the First World War Chart** ([Appendix 2a](#)) to organize their information. Students should use their textbook and/or the online resources listed below to define the event and hypothesize how that event might have led to the later outbreak of war.

Teachers may refer to the completed chart ([Appendix 2b](#)) to check answers.

Online Resources

- Franco-Prussian War – http://weuropeanhistory.suite101.com/article.cfm/the_franco-prussian_war_and_balance_of_power
- “The Sick man of Europe” – http://www.pbs.org/lawrenceofarabia/features/non_flash/ottoman1.html
- Dual Alliance – <http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/dualalliance.htm> and <http://www.worldwar1.com/tlalli.htm>
- Naval Arms Race – <http://www.worldwar1.com/tldread.htm> and http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/britain_wwone/invasion_ww1_01.shtml
- First Moroccan Crisis – <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/boshtml/bos137.htm>
- Triple Entente – <http://www.worldwar1.com/tlalli.htm>
- Young Turk Revolution – <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/boshtml/bos126.htm>
- Bosnian Crisis – <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/boshtml/bos130.htm>
- Second Moroccan Crisis – <http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/second-moroccan-crisis>
- First and Second Balkan Wars – <http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/serbia-and-greece-declare-war-on-ottoman-empire-in-first-balkan-war>
- The Black Hand – http://www.firstworldwar.com/features/balkan_causes.htm
- The Blank Check – <http://www.firstworldwar.com/origins/julycrisis.htm>
- The Schlieffen Plan – <http://www.firstworldwar.com/features/plans.htm>

Application

Creating a Chronology

Students evaluate the relative importance of the events studied in the previous lesson. Students will:

- Select the **five** events most important in the outbreak of First World War.
- Place the events in a cause-and-effect or timeline graphic organizer.
- Locate the events on a map.
- Write a concluding paragraph that explains the relationship of these events to one another and their significance in the outbreak of the war.

Ask students to share their chronologies with the class. Pose the question: *Why did students come to different conclusions about what caused the war?*

Check for Understanding

- ❖ Reflect on the events you identified as the most important in causing the outbreak of war. Is one of the long-term trends (Alliances, Imperialism, Militarism, and Nationalism) more apparent in these events than others? Explain your answer with historical evidence.

Rubric

- 2** – This response gives a valid explanation with accurate and relevant historical evidence.
- 1** – This response gives a valid explanation with inaccurate, irrelevant, or no historical evidence.

Lesson Three: Interpretations of the Causes of the War

Essential Question

- Why might historians disagree about the same historical event?

Instructional Strategies

Gathering Information

In direct instruction, explain to students that critiques of the Versailles Treaty emerged soon after the treaty was signed. (See "[The Versailles Treaty Reconsidered](#)")

Extending and Refining Making Predictions

Use this excerpt from the Sidney Bradshaw Fay's Thesis ([Appendix 3a](#)).
<http://web.viu.ca/davies/H482.WWI/Fay.Origins.WWI.1930.htm>

Distribute excerpt of Fay's thesis. Together as a class, read the brief biographical information about Fay and the opening arguments (pages 1–2). Clarify the identity of the main actors and any unknown vocabulary words. Ask students to identify Fay's thesis and make predictions about the specific arguments that will follow.

Main actors:

- Pashitch – Serbian prime minister
- Berchtold – Austro-Hungarian foreign minister
- Bethmann – German chancellor
- Sazonov – Russian foreign minister
- Poincare – French president
- San Giuliano – Italian foreign minister
- Sir Edward Grey – British foreign secretary


The rest of the excerpt is divided into sections by country as indicated by the lines: **Serbia, Austria, Germany, Russia, France, England, and Belgium**. In pairs, have students read **one** of the sections and summarize the section using the **Magnet Strategy**.³

Magnet Strategy

For their section of the reading, students identify one word that is the main topic. This word is the "magnet." Students write this word in the center of the page. Next, students identify 4–5 important words that are related (or attracted) to the magnet word. Finally, students summarize the reading by constructing one sentence that includes those words. (Longer sections may require more than one "magnet").

³ Thanks to Bill Lewis, who shared this reading strategy at a Historical Literacy Project workshop, 2010.

Example



***Serbia** was **guilty** in starting the war because she did not interfere when nationalists carried out an **assassination** as part of their struggle to **liberate** Slavs from **Austria**.*

Have students share their magnet summaries with the class.

Together as a class, fill out the “[Historian’s Head](#)” graphic organizer, [Appendix 3b](#), for Sidney Bradshaw Fay ([Appendix 3c](#) sample). Students should use this organizer as a model for their own analysis in the application activity below.

Check for Understanding

- ❖ Did Historian Sidney Bradshaw Fay agree with the Treaty of Versailles? Explain your answer with examples from his article.

Rubric

- 2** – This response gives a valid explanation with an accurate and relevant example.
- 1** – This response gives a valid explanation with an inaccurate, irrelevant, or no example.

Application Evaluating Conclusions

Students will now use what they learned about the causes of World War I in an evaluation of another historian's conclusions.

Assign each student to **one** of the following historians:

- Harry Barnes, *In Quest of Truth and Justice: De-Bunking the War Guilt Myth* (1928) [Appendix 3d](#)
- Laurence LaFore, *The Long Fuse: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War* (1965) [Appendix 3e](#)
- John Stoessinger, "The Iron Dice: World War I" in *Why Nations Go to War* (1985) [Appendix 3f](#)
- Donald Kagan, *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace* (1995) [Appendix 3g](#)

Students should use the **Magnet Strategy** to summarize the arguments of their historian. Next, students fill out the **Historian's Head** graphic organizer with the most significant historical evidence. Finally, students share their Historian's Head graphic organizers with the class.

Check for Understanding

- ❖ Why might historians disagree about the causes of the war? Use specific historical evidence to support your answer.

Rubric

- 2** – This response gives a valid explanation with accurate and relevant historical evidence.
1 – This response gives a valid explanation with inaccurate, irrelevant, or no historical evidence.

Appendix 1a

Anticipation Guide
World War I

Directions: In the column labeled *Before Instruction*, write “agree” or “disagree” next to each statement. Do the same in the column labeled *After Instruction* after we finish the unit.

Before Instruction		After Instruction
	World War I began with the attack on Pearl Harbor	
	Hitler was the leader of Germany during World War I	
	History is the study of facts about the past	
	If there are differences between what one history book says and what another history book says, one of the books is wrong.	
	It is not important to know about who writes history.	
	What we think about the past does not really affect us today.	

Trends Leading to Peace



Late 19th Century Euro



Late 19th Century Europe



La Belle Epoque

Historian John Keegan:

Europe in the summer of 1914 enjoyed a peaceful productivity so dependent on international exchange and co-operation that belief in the impossibility of general war seemed the most conventional of wisdoms.

International Organizations

- International Telegraph Union (1865)
- International Postal Union (1875)
- International Conference for Promoting Technical Uniformity in Railways (1882)

International Organizations

- International Meteorological Organisation (1873)
- International Radiotelegraph Union (1906)
- International Bureau of Weights and Measures (1875)
- First International Copyright Conventions (1880s)
- First Geneva Convention (1864)

Growth of Common European Culture

- University graduates across Europe shared a body of knowledge
- Tourism became a pastime for the middle classes

One Big Happy Family?

Queen Victoria's Grandchildren:

- Kaiser Wilhelm II of **Germany**
- Queen Sophia of **Greece**
- King George V of **Great Britain**
- Queen Maude of **Norway**
- Tsarina Alexandra of **Russia**
- Queen Marie of **Romania**
- Queen Margaret of **Sweden**
- Queen Victoria Eugenie of **Spain**

Tsar Nicholas II and King George V



Nicky and George

Kaiser Wilhelm II and Tsar Nicholas II



Willy and Nicky

Appendix 1b

Name _____

Four Trends That Led to War

Trend	Definition*	Visual Representation	Historical Example
Alliances	A formal agreement or treaty between two or more nations to cooperate for specific purposes.		
Imperialism	The policy of extending the rule or authority of an empire or nation over foreign countries, or of acquiring and holding colonies and dependencies.		
Militarism	The principle or policy of maintaining a large military establishment.		
Nationalism	Devotion and loyalty to one's own nation; patriotism.		

*Definitions from Dictionary.com. *Dictionary.com Unabridged*. Random House, Inc. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/alliance> (accessed: September 16, 2010).

Appendix 1c

Document Set 1 *How Did ALLIANCES Lead to War?*

Document A: Entente Cordiale –

http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_Entente_Cordiale_Between_The_United_Kingdom_and_France

Document B: Triple Alliance –

[http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Amended_Version_of_The_Triple_Alliance_\(English_translation_of_the_above\)](http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Amended_Version_of_The_Triple_Alliance_(English_translation_of_the_above))

Document C: Treaty of London – <http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/london1839.htm>

Document D: Map of Alliances –

http://www.bbc.co.uk/schools/worldwarone/hq/causes1_01.shtml

Document E: Political Cartoon of Alliances –

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:World_war_one_web_alliance.jpg

Document F: Political Cartoon Entente Cordiale –

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Germany_GB_France.gif

Document G: Triple Entente Poster – http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Triple_Entente.jpg

Document H: German-Turkish Agreement –

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/turkgerm.asp

Document I: Willy-Nicky Telegrams – http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_Willy-Nicky_Telegrams

http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_Willy-Nicky_Telegrams

Document J: Cupid to Seal the Balkan Peace –

<http://www.oldmagazinearticles.com/pdf/Arranged%20Marriage.pdf>

Overview of the alliance system and the outbreak of war –

<http://web.jjay.cuny.edu/~jobrien/reference/ob15.html>

Document Set 2
How Did IMPERIALISM Lead to War?

Document A: "The Lion's Just Share" – <http://www.lermuseum.org/ler/mh/wwi/index.html>

Document B: "Capitalistic Militarism" –
http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/II._Capitalistic_Militarism

Document C: "An Interrupted Tête-à-Tête" –
<http://www.harpweek.com/09cartoon/BrowseByDateCartoon.asp?Month=July&Date=1>

Document D: Bosnian Crisis 1908 –
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bosnian_Crisis_1908.jpg

Document E: China Imperialism Cartoon –
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:China_imperialism_cartoon.jpg

Document F: World Map of Colonies 1914 –
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:World_1914_empires_colonies_territory.PNG

Document G: Colonial Statistics –
<http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pol116/colonies.htm>

Document Set 3
How Did MILITARISM Lead to World War One?

Document A: Spending on Armaments – http://www.oldmagazinearticles.com/pdf/1913-Military_Expenditure.pdf

Document B: Germany's Budget – <http://www.oldmagazinearticles.com/pdf/pre%20war%20budget.pdf>

Document C: Germany and the Next War – <http://www.h-net.org/~german/gtext/kaiserreich/bernhardi.html>

Document D: Grey's Speech, 1909 – <http://web.jjay.cuny.edu/~jobrien/reference/ob71.html>

Document E: Mahan biography – <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,761128,00.html>

Document F: "Father Neptune" – <http://www.lermuseum.org/ler/mh/wwi/index.html>

Document G: "Fearing Conquest, Belgians Fortify Against Germany" – <http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84026749/1906-02-16/ed-1/seq-1/>

Document H: "Two Battleships Carried in Bill" – <http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84026749/1908-04-08/ed-1/seq-1/>

Document Set 4
How Did NATIONALISM Lead to War?

Document A: "The Watch on the Rhine" –

<http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1870wachtrhein.html>

Document B: "La Marseillaise" – <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/marseill.html>

Document C: Constitution of the Black Hand –

http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Constitution_of_the_Black_Hand

Document D: Nationalities of the Austro-Hungarian Empire Map –

http://www.newcastle.gov.uk/core.nsf/a/hmd_info13

Document E: "Balkan Troubles" –

http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Balkan_troubles1.jpg

Document F: "The Dogs of War" – http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Punch_-_The_Dogs_of_War.png

[_The_Dogs_of_War.png](http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Punch_-_The_Dogs_of_War.png)

Document G: "Finalmente!" –

http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Leopoldo_Metlicovitz_WWI_poster_-_Finalmente.jpg

Document H: Narodna Obrana – http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_Narodna_Odbrana

Document I: "Rule Britannia" – <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/rulebritannia.html>

Appendix 2a

Events That Led to the First World War Chart

Event	Definition	How this event led to war
Franco-Prussian War, 1870-1871		
"The Sick Man of Europe"		
Dual Alliance, 1879		
Naval Arms Race		
First Moroccan Crisis, 1905		
Triple Entente, 1907		

Event	Definition	How this event led to war
Young Turk Revolution, 1908		
Bosnian Crisis, 1908		
Second Moroccan Crisis, 1911		
First and Second Balkan Wars, 1912-1913		
The Black Hand		

Event	Definition	How this event led to war
The Blank Check		
The Schlieffen Plan		

Appendix 2b***Events That Led to the First World War
Teacher Chart***

Event	Definition	How did this event lead to war?
Franco-Prussian War, 1870-1871	Prussian Chancellor Bismarck goaded France into war. Southern German states joined Northern German states, quickly defeating France. New German Empire proclaimed at Versailles.	Powerful new German state created in the center of Europe, which upset balance of power. Harsh treatment of France, especially the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, led to tension between France and Germany.
"The Sick Man of Europe"	Nickname for the weak and unstable Ottoman Empire. Empire included ethnic groups that demanded independence. Empire spanned valuable territory, including Black Sea ports.	European powers competed with each other to gain control over Ottoman territories.
Dual Alliance, 1879	Germany and Austria-Hungary agreed to come to the other's aid if either were attacked by Russia.	Alliance tied Germany to the unstable Austro-Hungarian Empire. Alienated Russia sought out allies in France and Great Britain.
Naval Arms Race	Germany, under Kaiser Wilhelm II, challenged Great Britain's status as world's number one naval power. Germans poured money into building new battleships.	Great Britain responded to challenge by building even more battleships. British and Germans began to see each other as the enemy.
First Moroccan Crisis, 1905-1906	Germans challenged French colonial power by demanding independence for Morocco. At Algeiras conference, Spain, Italy, U.S., and Great Britain sided with France.	Germany appeared aggressive to France and Great Britain. Great Britain and France drew closer together diplomatically.

Event	Definition	How did this event lead to war?
Triple Entente, 1907	Great Britain and France settled their colonial disputes in Africa. Fear of German power brought Great Britain, France, and Russia into alliance.	If war came, Germany would face battle on western and eastern fronts. Germans less likely to restrain only remaining ally, Austria. Great Britain now unlikely to challenge Russian aggression. France now supported by two powerful allies, making it more confident.
Young Turk Revolution, 1908	A group of modernizing reformers took over the Ottoman Empire in a revolution. They intended to reform the empire and revive its strength.	European countries, especially Austria and Russia, wanted to act quickly to take advantage of the Ottoman Empire before the reformers had a chance to strengthen it.
Bosnian Crisis, 1908	Austria and Russia agreed to a coordinated attack on the Ottoman Empire—Austria would annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Russia would get access to the Black Sea straits. Austria acted quickly and seized Bosnia before Russia could act. Britain and France refused to allow Russia access.	Austria's annexation of Bosnia angered Slavic nationalists, especially Serbs, who had hoped to add Bosnia to Serbia. Russians angry and humiliated by Austria and determined not to let down Slavic "brothers" again. Great Britain and France would have to appease Russia in the future to keep Russia as an ally.
Second Moroccan Crisis, 1911	Germans sent gunboat Panther to the Moroccan port of Agadir to "protect German interests." France yielded parts of the Congo to Germany in exchange for Germany recognizing French control over Morocco.	Germany seen as aggressor, bringing France and Great Britain closer together.

Event	Definition	How did this event lead to war?
First and Second Balkan Wars, 1912-1913	Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia jointly attacked the Ottoman Empire, winning easily. The victors disagreed over the division of Balkan territory and went to war with each other. An international conference created the independent country of Albania.	Serbs angry that Albania was not awarded to Serbia, which would have given Serbs access to Adriatic Sea. Austria threatened by Serbian aggression in the Balkans. Russia humiliated by giving in to Austrian demands.
The Black Hand	Serbian secret society. On July 28, 1914, a Bosnian member assassinated Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand as he traveled through the streets of Sarajevo.	The assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne by a Slav provoked an international crisis. Austrians were determined to end the threat from Serbia once and for all.
The "Blank Check"	Austrians consulted their German allies about how to deal with Serbia. Kaiser Wilhelm II promised full German support for an Austrian attack on Serbia.	Austrians interpreted the Kaiser's message as unlimited support for Austria's attack on Serbia. Austrians were emboldened to deal with Serbia harshly.
The Schlieffen Plan	Among all European powers, mobilization was interpreted as an act of war, and the country that mobilized first had the advantage. Germany's only battle plan, the Schlieffen Plan, anticipated a two-front war. Germans planned to invade and quickly defeat France, then turn its forces to the east.	The Schlieffen plan guaranteed that the conflict between Austria and Serbia would spread to the rest of Europe. Once Russia mobilized its forces against Austria, Germany sent its troops west, violating Belgian neutrality and bringing France and Great Britain into war.

The Versailles Treaty Reconsidered

Early Critics

John Maynard Keynes, English Economist



The Economic Consequences of the Peace, 1920

Keynes argued that the treaty would bring economic ruin to Europe:

"The Treaty includes no provisions for the economic rehabilitation of Europe, - nothing to make the defeated Central Empires into good neighbors, nothing to stabilize the new States of Europe, nothing to reclaim Russia; nor does it promote in any way a compact of economic solidarity amongst the Allies themselves; no arrangement was reached at Paris for restoring the disordered finances of France and Italy, or to adjust the systems of the Old World and the New."

Other critics believed that the treaty sowed the seeds of future war...



Will Dyson, *Daily Herald* (UK), May 1919



Will Dyson, *Daily Herald* (UK), May 1919

Historians began to debate...



Was Germany *really* responsible for starting the war?

Appendix 3a

The Origins of the World War (excerpts) *Sidney B. Fay*

<http://web.viu.ca/davies/H482.WWI/Fay.Origins.WWI.1930.htm>

Sidney B. Fay was educated in Germany and wrote on the history of Prussia in the eighteenth century. He has been charged with showing a pro-German bias. Even so, his two-volume history, The Origins of the World War, admirably reflects the revisionist view. What follows is his conclusion, in which the responsibility of all the participants is assessed.

None of the Powers wanted a European War. Their governing rulers and ministers, with very few exceptions, all foresaw that it must be a frightful struggle, in which the political results were not absolutely certain, but in which the loss of life, suffering, and economic consequences were bound to be terrible. This is true, in a greater or less degree, of Pashitch, Berchtold, Bethmann, Sazonov, Poincare, San Giuliano and Sir Edward Grey. Yet none of them, not even Sir Edward Grey, could have foreseen that the political results were to be so stupendous, and the other consequences so terrible, as was actually the case.

Nevertheless, a European War broke out. Why? Because in each country political and military did certain things which led to mobilizations and declarations of war, or failed to do certain things which might have prevented them. In this sense, all the European countries, in a greater or less degree, were responsible. One must abandon the dictum of the Versailles Treaty that Germany and her allies were solely responsible. It was a dictum exacted by victors from vanquished, under the influence of the blindness, ignorance, hatred, and the propagandist misconceptions to which war had given rise. It was based on evidence which was incomplete and not always sound. It is generally recognized by the best historical scholars in all countries to be no longer tenable or defensible. They are agreed that the responsibility for the War is a divided responsibility. But they still disagree very much as to the relative part of this responsibility that falls on each country and on each individual political or military leader.

Some writers like to fix positively in some precise mathematical fashion the exact responsibility for the war. This was done in one way by the framers of Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles. It has been done in other ways by those who would fix the responsibility in some relative fashion, as, for instance, Austria first, then Russia, France and Germany and England. But the present writer deprecates such efforts to assess by a precise formula a very complicated question, which is after all more a matter of delicate shading than of definite white and black. Oversimplification, as Napoleon once said in framing his Code, is the enemy of precision. Moreover, even supposing that a general consensus of opinion might be reached as to the relative responsibility of any individual country or man for immediate causes connected with the July crisis of 1914, it is by no means necessarily true that the same relative responsibility would hold for the underlying causes, which for years had been tending toward the creation of a dangerous situation.

One may, however, sum up very briefly the most salient facts in regard to each country.

Serbia felt a natural and justifiable impulse to do what so many other countries had done in the nineteenth century—to bring under one national Government all the discontented Serb people. She had liberated those under Turkish rule; the next step was to liberate those under Hapsburg rule. She looked to Russia for assistance, and had been encouraged to

expect that she would receive it. After the assassination, Mr. Pashitch took no steps to dish cover and bring to justice Serbians in Belgrade who had been implicated in the plot. One of them, Ciganovitch, was even assisted to disappear. Mr. Pashitch waited to see what evidence the Austrian authorities could find. When Austria demanded cooperation of Serbian officials in discovering, though not in trying, implicated Serbians, the Serbian Government made a very conciliatory but negative reply. They expected that the reply would not be regarded as satisfactory, and, even before it was given, ordered the mobilization of the Serbian army. Serbia did not want war, but believed it would be forced upon her. That Mr. Pashitch was aware of the plot three weeks before it was executed, failed to take effective steps to prevent the assassins from crossing over from Serbia to Bosnia, and then failed to give Austria any warning or information which might have averted the fatal crime, were facts unknown to Austria in July, 1914; they cannot therefore be regarded as in any way justifying Austria's conduct; but they are part of Serbia's responsibility, and a very serious part.

Austria was more responsible for the immediate origin of the war than any other Power. Yet from her own point of view she was acting in self-defence - not against an immediate military attack, but against the corroding Greater Serbia and Yugoslav agitation which her leaders believed threatened her very existence. No State can be expected to sit with folded arms and await dismemberment at the hands of its neighbors. Russia was believed to be intriguing with Serbia and Rumania against the Dual Monarchy. The assassination of the heir to the throne, as a result of a plot prepared in Belgrade, demanded severe retribution; otherwise Austria would be regarded as incapable of action, "worm-eaten" as the Serbian Press expressed it, would sink in prestige, and hasten her own downfall. To avert this Berchtold determined to crush Serbia with war. He deliberately framed the ultimatum with the expectation and hope that it would be rejected. He hurriedly declared war against Serbia in order to forestall all efforts at mediation. He refused even to answer his own ally's urgent requests to come to an understanding with Russia, on the basis of a military occupation of Belgrade as a pledge that Serbia would carry out the promises in her reply to the ultimatum. Berchtold gambled on a "local" war with Serbia only, believing that he could rattle the German sword; but rather than abandon his war with Serbia, he was ready to drag the rest of Europe into war.

It is very questionable whether Berchtold's obstinate determination to diminish Serbia and destroy her as a Balkan factor was, after all, the right method, even if he had succeeded in keeping the war "localized" and in temporarily strengthening the Dual Monarchy. Supposing that Russia in 1914, because of military unpreparedness or lack of support, had been ready to tolerate the execution of Berchtold's designs, it is quite certain that she would have aimed within the next two or three years at wiping out this second humiliation, which was so much more damaging to her prestige than that of 1908-09. In two or three years, when her great program of military reform was finally completed, Russia would certainly have found a pretext to reverse the balance in the Balkans in her own favor again. A further consequence of Berchtold's policy, even if successful, would have been the still closer consolidation of the Triple Entente, with the possible addition of Italy. And, finally, a partially dismembered Serbia would have become a still greater source of unrest and danger to the peace of Europe than heretofore. Serbian nationalism, like Polish nationalism, would have been intensified by partition. Austrian power and prestige would not have been so greatly in-creased as to be able to meet these new dangers. Berchtold's plan was a mere temporary improvement, but could not be a final solution of the Austro-Serbian antagonism. Franz Ferdinand and many others recognized this, and so long as he lived, no step in this fatal direction had been taken. It was the tragic fate of Austria that the only man who might have had the power and ability to develop Austria along sound lines became the innocent

victim of the crime which was the occasion of the World War and so of her ultimate disruption.

Germany did not plot a European War, did not want one, and made genuine, though too belated efforts, to avert one. She was the victim of her alliance with Austria and of her own folly. Austria was her only dependable ally, Italy and Rumania having become nothing but allies in name. She could not throw her over, as otherwise she would stand isolated between Russia, where Pan Slavism and armaments were growing stronger every year, and France, where Alsace-Lorraine, Delcasse's fall, and Agadir were not forgotten. Therefore, Bethmann felt bound to accede to Berchtold's request for support and gave him a free hand to deal with Serbia; he also hoped and expected to "localize" the Austro-Serbian conflict. Germany then gave grounds to the Entente for suspecting the sincerity of her peaceful intentions by her denial of any foreknowledge of the ultimatum, by her support and justification of it when it was published, and by her refusal of Sir Edward Grey's conference proposal. However, Germany by no means had Austria so completely under her thumb as the Entente Powers and many writers have assumed. It is true that Berchtold would hardly have embarked on his gambler's policy unless he had been assured that Germany would fulfill the obligations of the alliance, and to this extent Germany must share the great responsibility of Austria. But when Bethmann realized that Russia was likely to intervene, that England might not remain neutral, and that there was danger of a world war of which Germany and Austria would appear to be the instigators, he tried to call a halt on Austria, but it was too late. He pressed mediation proposals on Vienna, but Berchtold was insensible to the pressure, and the Entente Powers did not believe in the sincerity of his pressure, especially as they produced no results.

Germany's geographical position between France and Russia, and her inferiority in number of troops, had made necessary the plan of crushing the French army quickly at first and then fuming against Russia. This was only possible, in the opinion of her strategists, by marching through Belgium, as it was generally anticipated by military men that she would do in case of a European War. On July 29, after Austria had declared war on Serbia, and after the Tsar had assented to general mobilization in Russia (though this was not known in Berlin and was later postponed for a day owing to the Kaiser's telegram to the Tsar), Bethmann took the precaution of sending to the German Minister in Brussels a sealed envelope. The Minister was not to open it except on further instructions. It contained the later demand for the passage of the German army through Belgium. This does not mean, however, that Germany had decided for war. In fact, Bethmann was one of the last of the statesmen to abandon hope of peace and to consent to the mobilization of his country's army. General mobilization of the continental armies took place in the following order: Serbia, Russia, Austria, France and Germany. General mobilization by a Great Power was commonly interpreted by military men in every country, though perhaps not by Sir Edward Grey, the Tsar, and some civilian officials, as meaning that the country was on the point of making war - that the military machine had begun to move and would not be stopped. Hence, when Germany learned of the Russian general mobilization, she sent ultimatums to St. Petersburg and Paris, warning that German mobilization would follow unless Russia suspended hers within twelve hours, and asking what would be the attitude of France. The answers being unsatisfactory, Germany then mobilized and declared war. It was the hasty Russian general mobilization, assented to on July 29 and ordered on July 30, while Germany was still trying to bring Austria to accept mediation proposals, which finally rendered the European War inevitable.

Russia was partly responsible for the Austro-Serbian conflict because of the frequent encouragement which she had given at Belgrade—that Serbian national unity would be ultimately achieved with Russian assistance at Austrian expense. This had led the Belgrade Cabinet to hope for Russian support in case of a war with Austria, and the hope did not prove vain in July, 1914. Before this, to be sure, in the Bosnian Crisis and during the Balkan Wars, Russia had put restraint upon Serbia, because Russia, exhausted by the effects of the Russo-Japanese War, was not yet ready for a European struggle with the Teutonic Powers. But in 1914 her armaments, though not yet completed, had made such progress that the militarists were confident of success, if they had French and British support. In the spring of 1914, the Minister of War, Sukhomlinov, had published an article in a Russian newspaper, though without signing his name, to the effect, "Russia is ready, France must be ready also." Austria was convinced that Russia would ultimately aid Serbia, unless the Serbian danger was dealt with energetically after the Archduke's murder; she knew that Russia was growing stronger every year; but she doubted whether the Tsar's armaments had yet reached the point at which Russia would dare to intervene; she would therefore run less risk of Russian intervention and a European War if she used the Archduke's assassination as an excuse for weakening Serbia, than if she should postpone action until the future.

Russia's responsibility lay also in the secret preparatory military measures which she was making at the same time that she was carrying on diplomatic negotiations. These alarmed Germany and Austria. But it was primarily Russia's general mobilization, made when Germany was trying to bring Austria to a settlement, which precipitated the final catastrophe, causing Germany to mobilize and declare war.

The part of **France** is less clear than that of the other Great Powers, because she has not yet made a full publication of her documents. To be sure, Poincare, in the fourth volume of his memoirs, has made a skilful and elaborate plea, to prove "La France innocents." But he is not convincing. It is quite clear that on his visit to Russia he assured the Tsar's Government that France would support her as an ally in preventing Austria from humiliating or crushing Serbia. Paleologue renewed these assurances in a way to encourage Russia to take a strong hand. He did not attempt to restrain Russia from military measures which he knew would call forth German counter-measures and cause war. Nor did he keep his Government promptly and fully informed of the military steps which were being taken at St. Petersburg. President Poincare, upon his return to France, made efforts for peace, but his great preoccupation was to minimize French and Russian preparatory measures and emphasize those of Germans, in order to secure the certainty of British support in a struggle which he now regarded as inevitable.

Sir Edward Grey made many sincere proposals for preserving peace; they all failed owing partly, but not exclusively, to Germany's attitude. Sir Edward could probably have prevented war if he had done either of two things. If, early in the crisis, he had acceded to the urging of France and Russia and given a strong warning to Germany that, in a European war, **England** would take the side of the Franco-Russian Alliance, this would probably have led Bethmann to exert an earlier and more effective pressure on Austria; and it would perhaps thereby have prevented the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia, and brought to a successful issue the "direct conversations" between Vienna and St. Petersburg. Or, if Sir Edward Grey had listened to German urging, and warned France and Russia early in the crisis that if they became involved in war, England would remain neutral, probably Russia would have hesitated with her mobilizations, and France would probably have exerted a restraining influence at St. Petersburg. But Sir Edward Grey could not say that England would take the side of France and Russia, because he had a Cabinet nearly evenly divided,

and he was not sure, early in the crisis, that public opinion in England would back him up in war against Germany. He could resign, and he says in his memoirs that he would have resigned, but that would have been no comfort or aid to France, who had come confidently to count upon British support. He was determined to say and do nothing which might encourage her with a hope which he could not fulfill. Therefore, in spite of the pleadings of the French, he refused to give them definite assurances until the probable German determination to go through Belgium made it clear that the Cabinet, and Parliament, and British public opinion would follow his lead in war on Germany. On the other hand, he was unwilling to heed the German pleadings that he exercise restraint at Paris and St. Petersburg, because he did not wish to endanger the Anglo-Russian Entente and the solidarity of the Triple Entente, because he felt a moral obligation to France, growing out of the Anglo-French military and naval conversations of the past years, and because he suspected that Germany was backing Austria up in an unjustifiable course and that Prussian militarists had taken the direction of affairs at Berlin out of the hands of Herr van Bethmann-Hollweg and the civilian authorities.

Italy exerted relatively little influence on the crisis in either direction.

Belgium had done nothing in any way to justify the demand which Germany made upon her. With commendable prudence, at the very first news of the ominous Austrian ultimatum, she had foreseen the danger to which she might be exposed. She had accordingly instructed her representatives abroad as to the statements which they were to make in case Belgium should decide very suddenly to mobilize to protect her neutrality. On July 29, she placed her army upon "a strengthened war footing," but did not order complete mobilization until two days later, when Austria, Russia, and Germany had already done so, and war appeared inevitable. Even after being confronted with the terrible German ultimatum, on August 2, she did not at once invite the assistance of English and French troops to aid her in the defense of her soil and her neutrality against a certain German assault; it was not until German troops had actually violated her territory, on August 4, that she appealed for the assistance of the Powers which had guaranteed her neutrality. Belgium was the innocent victim of German strategic necessity. Though the German violation of Belgium was of enormous influence in forming public opinion as to the responsibility for the War after hostilities began, it was not a cause of the War, except in so far as it made it easier for Sir Edward Grey to bring England into it.

In the forty years following the Franco-Prussian War, as we have seen, there developed a system of alliances which divided Europe into two hostile groups. This hostility was accentuated by the increase of armaments, economic rivalry, nationalist ambitions and antagonisms, and newspaper incitement. But it is very doubtful whether all these dangerous tendencies would have actually led to war, had it not been for the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. That was the factor which consolidated the elements of hostility and started the rapid and complicated succession of events which culminated in a World War, and for that factor Serbian nationalism was primarily responsible.

But the verdict of the Versailles Treaty that Germany and her allies were responsible for the War, in view of the evidence now available, is historically unsound. It should therefore be revised. However, because of the popular feeling widespread in some of the Entente countries, it is doubtful whether a formal and legal revision is as yet practicable. There must first come a further revision by historical scholars, and through them of public opinion.

Appendix 3b

Historian's Head

Historian: _____

Nationality: _____ Year of Publication: _____

The Treaty of Versailles was _____

correct/in correct

The First World War was caused by _____

Most Important Evidence:

Appendix 3c

Historian: Sidney Bradshaw Fay
Nationality: U.S. Year of Publication: 1930
educated in Germany

The Treaty of Versailles was incorrect
(correct/incorrect)

The First World War was caused by bad decisions made by most of the countries involved.

Most Important Evidence:

- Austria determined to put an end to the Serbian threat; Berchtold deliberately wrote an unacceptable ultimatum.
- Serbians committed to liberating Serbs under Austro-Hungarian rule; Protected assassins.
- Russia mobilized its army first; encouraged Serbia to fight against Austria
- France encouraged Russia to take a strong stand against Austria
- England did not make clear if it would remain neutral or intervene on behalf of France and Russia.

Appendix 3d

Harry Elmer Barnes, *In Quest of Truth and Justice: De-Bunking the War Guilt Myth*. The Right Wing Individualist Tradition in America series. Chicago: National Historical Society, 1928.

Professor of History at Columbia University, NY.

"The problem of who started the World War has now reached a stage where it can be discussed with assurance, with respect to both the facts and the bearing of these facts upon the peace of the world and the future of Europe... There can be no hope of establishing peace in Europe until the moral and material injustices of the Treaties of Versailles, St. Germain and Trianon are undone and Europe is reconstructed in harmony with justice and decency" (1-2).

"The Causes of Wars in General: By the causes of wars in general we mean those diverse aspects of the European international system in the half century before the War which predisposed Europe to war whenever a crisis of sufficient proportions arose. As characteristic of this state of affairs making for war in times of international tension, one would naturally list such things as the super-patriotic national state, the cult of war, racial and national arrogance, the growth of great armaments, secret diplomacy, the struggle for raw materials and markets, the system of differential and discriminatory tariffs, population pressure, the doctrine of absolute national sovereignty, the conception of national honor, opposition to international organization and arbitration... When we consider such causes of war as the general factors listed above, it must be frankly admitted that all parties involved in the War were about equally guilty" (11).

"Serbia and the Assassination of Franz Ferdinand: The precious war time legend of a 'poor, innocent little Serbia' that bravely defied extinction by the brutal and unprovoked Hapsburg bully was dealt a staggering blow as early as 1923 by the revelation that the plot was laid and executed by the chief of the intelligence division of the Serbian general staff, Colonel Dragutin Dimitrievitch... In the last three years the revelations as to Serbian guilt in the Archduke's assassination have been truly amazing" (40).

"Of one thing we are certain, namely, that Colonel Dimitrievitch, who directed the assassination plot, worked in collusion with Artamanov, the Russian military attaché in Belgrade [capital of Serbia], and also with the knowledge of Hartwig, the Russian minister in Belgrade. These two men were aware of the plot long in advance of the 28th of June 1914. Hence it is obvious that either they did not inform their home government or else the Russians did not attempt to crush the conspiracy... It has been stated from a number of independent Serbian sources that, before he dared to send the assassins to Bosnia, Dimitrievitch secured a Russian promise of protection for Serbia against Austria" (43).

"The Austro-Hungarian Peril... By all odds the chief fact in favor of Austria and the most damaging to the Entente relates to the assurances which Austria gave... that she would not impair the sovereignty or territorial integrity of Serbia. Russia has based her claim to a right to intervene on behalf of Serbia on the ground that she could not stand by and see Serbia destroyed. As Austria gave full assurance that no destruction of Serbia, either political or territorial, was contemplated, the Russian case for intervention then disappeared" (48).

"The German Attitude in 1914... There is no longer any doubt that, if England had promised her neutrality in the event that Germany respected Belgian neutrality, Germany would have been happy to do so. Nor is there much doubt that, if England had given a sharp preliminary warning that she would intervene in the event of the invasion of Belgium, Germany would have changed her plans" (56).

"It so happened that in 1914 France and Russia had, as their leading objectives in foreign policy, goals which could only be obtained by war, while Germany was in a position to profit by the maintenance of the status quo" (56-57).

"The Immediate Responsibility of Russia for the World War... It is impossible to read the Russian documents in the period from 1904 to 1914 and doubt that Russia was determined to secure the [Black Sea] Straits at any price. By 1913 it had become apparent that this price would be European war" (57).

"In the early summer of 1914 Russia was menaced by the prospect of an economic and social revolution more serious than that of 1905... Pan-Slavism had been developed as a patriotic antidote to radicalism in Russia and a Pan-Slavic was had been held in reserve as a trump-card to be played in the event of another revolution" (58).

"The French Collusion with Russia... Even before 1910 it was fully understood that the [Black Sea] Straits and Alsace-Lorraine were inseparably coupled as the cornerstone of the [Franco-Russian] Alliance... It is shown that [The French Minister of Foreign Affairs] Delcassé discussed the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine with the Russians on his mission to Russia in 1913, and that when the War broke out France insisted upon adding to this the destruction of the economic power of Germany" (68).

"It was well-known that [French president] Poincaré made his crucial decision for war at a ministerial council on the night of July 29th, when the Russians were told to go ahead with their mobilization plans that meant certain European war. From this time onward, Poincaré's program consisted in stifling opposition to his plans for war and in formulating deceptions and subterfuges, designed to deceive the world, and particularly the publics of France, England and Italy, as to the real intentions of and policies of France" (71).

Appendix 3e

Laurence Lafore, *The Long Fuse: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War I*. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1965.

Laurence Lafore: American (1917-1985) – Professor of History at Swarthmore College and the University of Iowa.

“The war... grew out of a single international event, which was the conflict between the Habsburg Monarchy and the kingdom of Serbia. Had Austria-Hungary been differently constituted, had Serbia posed a less lethal threat to it, there would have been no Austro-Serbian war in 1914; and if a general war had come later, it would have been fought on different terms and taken different forms. It was the system of alliances and the changing balance of military power in Europe that converted a Balkan dispute into a world war, but it did not cause the particular war that happened to be fought” (17).

“Therefore, it seems plausible to examine the outbreak of war in 1914 with principal focus upon the role that Austria-Hungary and its neighbors played in its background; but there are larger reasons than this for focusing on Southeastern Europe. For a hundred years and more, Europe, the prosperous and stable Europe of the west and the north, has suffered from the complexities of the land and peoples of the east and the southeast, whose difficulties have intruded themselves on Great Powers and have, by magnetic attraction, drawn Great Powers into conflict... In tracing almost any of the circumstances that were most critical in 1914, one is led back to the national conflicts of Central and Southeastern Europe” (17-18).

“The European System of national states required that a line be drawn between international and domestic affairs. In international affairs the sovereign state was deemed to be a unit, speaking with a single voice... The other Powers were constructed upon a foundation of nationality. Austria-Hungary was not. Major threats to the stability of the System came in the end, by 1914, from the magnetic or divisive forces exercised by minorities in national states. Austria-Hungary consisted entirely of minorities” (56).

“For Austria-Hungary, the neat distinction between domestic and foreign could not, in the last analysis, exist. It could not act as a national state; and it was impossible for its neighbors, themselves affected by its peculiar composition, to act toward it as they could toward a national state. It was this situation that brought about the outbreak of the first World War” (57).

“The needs and ambitions had underlaid the tensions of Europe and had shaped the alliance system and the policies of the Powers. But they none of them had led to actions that produced war. They were either negotiable or repressible. The one problem that was neither negotiable nor repressible was that raised by threats to the integrity of Austria-Hungary. The composition of the Habsburg Monarchy made it fatally vulnerable to the activities of the Serbs... It was this problem that caused the war which became the First World War” (268).

Appendix 3f

John G. Stoessinger, "The Iron Dice: World War I" in *Why Nations Go to War*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985.

About the author: Fled Nazi-occupied Austria in 1939. Came to the United States in 1947. BA – Grinnell College, PhD – Harvard.

"A study of the leading personalities of the time and the manner in which they perceived one another may be more fruitful analyses than to postulate such abstractions as alliance systems, militarism, or nationalism" (2).

"The crucial events to be examined on the threshold of war are the German pledge of support to Austria in her policy toward Serbia; Austria's ultimatum to Serbia and the rejection of the Serbian response; Germany's efforts to mediate and to restrain Austria; and the actual outbreak of general war on August 1, precipitated by Germany's declaration of war on Russia and the invasion of Luxembourg and Belgium" (2-3).

Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany "believed that the assassination [of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand] represented a profound threat to the monarchical principle...

On July 5 he took the fateful step of assuring Austria that she could count on Germany's 'faithful support' even if the punitive action she was planning to take against Serbia would bring her into conflict with Russia. In other words, the Kaiser issued Austria-Hungary a blank check... The incredible fact is that the German Kaiser had not the slightest idea of what the Austrians would do. Impelled by a generous impulse of loyalty to his dead friend, he offered what he thought would be moral support to the aggrieved party. That this guarantee would entail military support never seriously occurred to him or to the German military and governmental apparatus that fully supported his move" (4).

"The Kaiser's decision to support Austria-Hungary under any circumstances demonstrated an extraordinary confusion of personal ethics and political judgment. His friendship with the archduke prompted him to place the fate of his nation in the hands of another power. His view of the Russian czar as a kindred-spirited fellow monarch led him to assume that such a relinquishment of control carried no risk whatever. And his romanticism robbed him of all flexibility in the emerging crisis" (4-5).

"Conrad von Hotzendorff, Austria-Hungary's chief of staff and head of the militarist party in Vienna, believed passionately in the need to preserve his nation's status as a great power. Even before Sarajevo he feared the disintegration of the Habsburg empire from either internal decay or violent overthrow by its enemies. If Austria-Hungary accepted this final insult, then the dual monarchy would indeed become a 'worm-eaten museum piece.' Thus Serbia had to be dealt a punishing blow quickly, before the situation deteriorated even further" (6).

"It now becomes essential to this analysis to consider the actual situation in Russia at the time of Sarajevo... The popular response in Russia to the Austro-Serbian rupture was extremely heated. On July 26 crowds chanting 'Down with Austria' and 'Long live Serbia' marched through the streets of St. Petersburg" (11).

"In conjunction with its declaration of war against Serbia, Austria-Hungary had mobilized eight out of a total of sixteen army corps. By this action Berchtold [Austria-Hungary's foreign minister] hoped not only to administer a decisive military defeat to Serbia but also to frighten off Russia from intervening. Sazonov [Russia's foreign minister], however, viewed this partial mobilization as directed against Russia and so decided to order a partial mobilization of his own. He hoped that quick Russian action would deter Austria from

attacking Serbia in the first place. Thus, both the Austrian and Russian decisions to mobilize a part of their armies were essentially bluffs designed to deter the other side" (11-12).

"As emperors and statesmen on all sides gradually lost control over the deepening crisis, generals and military staffs began to dominate the scene. During the final period before the outbreak of general war, one appalling fact becomes terrifyingly clear: the unrelenting rigidity of military schedules and timetables on all sides. All these had been worked out in minute detail years before, in case war should come. Now that it was imminent, each general was terrified lest his adversary move first and thus capture the initiative. Everywhere, then, military staffs exerted mounting pressure on their chiefs of state to move schedules ahead so as to strike the first blow" (15).

"Finally, one is struck with the overwhelming mediocrity of the personalities involved. The character of each of the leaders, diplomats, or generals was badly flawed by arrogance, stupidity, carelessness, or weakness... As a result of their weakness a generation of Europe's young men was destroyed" (24).

Appendix 3g

Donald Kagan, *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace*. New York: Doubleday, 1995.

Donald Kagan (b. 1932) – American. Professor of History at Yale University.

“At the turn of the twentieth century Germany was the strongest military power in the world. It also had the strongest and most dynamic economy on the Continent. In 1897, without any previous naval tradition, without any new challenge from the sea to require an expensive change in policy, the Germans undertook the construction of a major battle fleet concentrated in the North Sea where it threatened British naval superiority and the only security available to Britain. The British gradually became alarmed as they came to recognize the threat Germany posed” (206).

“Repeated statements by the German Emperor and many other leaders in and outside the government asserted that Germany was aiming at ‘world power,’ that it demanded ‘a place in the sun,’ that ‘no question of world politics must be settled without the consent of the German Emperor” (206).

“Wilhelmine Germany was not just another European nation seeking to maintain its national interest or even to advance it by means tolerable to its neighbors. From the 1890s imperial Germany was a fundamentally dissatisfied power, eager to disrupt the status quo and to achieve its expansive goals, by bullying if possible, by war if necessary” (209).

“No peace keeps itself. After the Franco-Prussian War, Bismarck judged it to be in the interests of Germany to exercise restraint and maintain the peace of Europe. For twenty years under his guidance Germany accepted the major burden of keeping the peace by maintaining a powerful military force and using it to help avoid war. When William II and his ministers abandoned that role and became the chief menace to the status quo and the peace of Europe, the only power capable of taking its place and checking the movement toward war was Great Britain. Reluctantly, slowly, and ultimately inadequately, the British assumed some part of that burden. They undertook just enough responsibility to avoid defeat narrowly but not enough to deter war” (212).

“Suppose, however, that the British had looked at their predicament clearly, honestly, and courageously in the years between 1898 and 1914. Suppose they had faced the fact that only the assurance of a large, well-trained British army that could quickly come to France’s aid in case of attack could make a German victory in the West impossible and obviously so... It would have meant going against an honored and comfortable tradition; it would have been costly and would have strained the British economy at a time when there was great pressure for domestic spending; it would have been at odds with the great libertarian ethic central to the British character – but the result would have been the presence of a standing army and a large trained reserve in 1914. That would have made the Schlieffen Plan or any conceivable German plan of war obviously absurd and certain to fail... [The British] could have spared Britain and Europe more than four terrible years of war, horrendous casualties, and the rapid loss of their place in the world” (214).